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Kyoto Guidelines: Applicable Law

International Law Association’s Guidelines on
Intellectual Property and Private International
Law (“Kyoto Guidelines”): Applicable Law
by Marie-Elodie Ancel, Nicolas Binctin, Josef Drexl, Mireille van Eechoud, Jane C Ginsburg, Toshiyuki Kono,
Gyooho Lee, Rita Matulionyte, Edouard Treppoz, Dário Moura Vicente

Abstract:
The chapter “Applicable Law” of the
International Law Association’s Guidelines on Intellectual Property and Private International Law
(“Kyoto Guidelines”) provides principles on the choice
of law in international intellectual property matters.
The Guidelines confirm the traditional principle of the
lex loci protectionis for the existence, transferability, scope and infringement of intellectual property
rights. The law applicable to the initial ownership of

registered rights is governed by the lex loci protectionis whereas the law of the closest connection is
applied to determine the ownership of copyright. For
contracts, freedom of choice is acknowledged. With
regard to ubiquitous or multi-state infringement and
collective rights management in the field of copyright,
the Guidelines suggest innovative solutions. Finally,
the chapter contains a Guideline on the law applicable to the arbitrability of disputes.
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A. General Rules

Short comments

19. Existence, Scope and Transferability (lex loci
protectionis)

1

The law applicable to determine the existence,
validity, registration, duration, transferability,
and scope of an intellectual property right, and
all other matters concerning the right as such,
is the law of the State for which protection is
sought.
See as reference provisions
§§ 301, 314 ALI Principles
Arts 3:102, 3:301 CLIP Principles
Art 305 Transparency Proposal
Arts 301, 309 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

1

44

The Guideline makes “matters concerning the right
as such” subject to the law of the “State for which
the protection is sought” (lex loci protectionis). This
approach is in line with the traditional approach
and reflects the idea that intellectual property
rights are the outcome of policy choices of States.
“State for which the protection is sought” should
be distinguished from lex fori and is usually
understood in terms of rights which require its
registration in each jurisdiction such as patent and
trademark as the State of registration. For other
rights, which do not arise from registration, for
instance copyright, the lex loci protectionis refers
to the law of the State which recognizes the right.
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2

and cultural policies represent policy decisions, but
under the regime of TRIPS, commercial or trade
policies could be a part of them as well.

The Guidelines distinguish proprietary aspects of
an intellectual property right from its contractual
arrangements. This paragraph applies the law
of the State for which protection is sought (lex
loci protectionis) to the proprietary aspects, which
typically include existence, validity, duration and
scope. “Existence” of an intellectual property right
means that the right is recognized as an exclusive
right in a State. “Registration” as a requirement of
the existence and the validity of certain types of
intellectual property rights includes its procedural
aspects. The “scope” concerns to what extent the
protection of an intellectual property right reaches,
typically, for instance, whether moral right, mere
use, exhaustion, or renumeration right is a part of
the right, and naturally also covers the limits and
exceptions of the protection. “Transferability” of
an intellectual property right could be placed in an
independent provision, since it concerns a dynamic
aspect of right, while others concern static aspects
of proprietary right. However, the Guideline clarifies
its stance to place both aspects in one provision by
stating that “all other matters concerning the right
as such”.

4

The language “State for which the protection is
sought“ is carefully chosen, especially to distinguish
it from the “State where the protection sought“ in
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, as there is a
scholarly debate if “State where the protection
sought” in the Convention would mean the principle
of choice of law. Also, the language of the Berne
Convention could be interpreted as referring to the
lex fori. By contrast, “State for which the protection
is sought” has also been adopted in Article 8 of the
Rome II Regulation.

5

How to identify the “State for which the protection
is sought“? If the right holder of a patent seeks
protection of his/her patent in the territory of State
A, the law of State A is lex loci protectionis. However, if
his/her invention is not registered in State A, there
is no legal basis at the level of substantive patent law
to protect the claimant. In the Card Reader Case1, the
Japanese Supreme Court chose US patent law as the
law applicable to an injunction, but then rejected to
apply it, as extra-territorial application of US-patent
law would violate public policy (the territoriality
principle) in Japan. The Supreme Court did not use
the term lex loci protectionis in its judgment. If this
Guideline would have been applied, Japanese law
should have been identified as lex loci protectionis, as
the right holder wanted to protect his patent in the
territory of Japan. But his patent was not registered
in Japan, hence he could not get any legal protection.
Although this result is the same as the judgment of
the Japanese Supreme Court, the way to conclusion
is different.

6

For other rights, which do not arise from registration,
the lex loci protectionis refers to the law of the State
which recognizes the right concerned. In legal
practice the claimant should identify for which
States he wants to protect his rights, when he
formulates his claims. Therefore, lex loci protectionis
usually corresponds to the market where the right
holder seeks protection.

Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
A, resident in State X, holds a patent registered in
State Y. A believes that B, a company which was
incorporated and has its headquarters in State X,
infringes A’s patent in State Y. A sues B in State X, the
place of defendant‘s domicile, for compensation. B
argues that A’s patent in State Y is invalid. The court
of State X should apply the law of State Y to render a
judgment (as for the jurisdiction of the court in State
X, see Guideline 11(2)).
Hypothetical 2
A, composer living in State X, signs a contract with
B, an opera company in State Y, to create a new
production of an opera composed by A. The license
contract contains a choice of court clause (State X as
agreed forum State), but no choice of law clause. On
the first night, A realizes that in this new production,
the ending scene of the opera is differently staged
from his original idea, while the musical part was not
changed. A sues B in State X for compensation and
injunction restraining B from performing infringing
acts in State Y. The copyright law of State Y should
be applied to the question if such a staging would
infringe A’s copyright.

3

1

Definitions
7

The Guidelines distinguish proprietary aspects of
an intellectual property right from contractual
arrangements. The latter is covered by Guidelines
21 and 22, while this Guideline deals with proprietary
aspects of an intellectual property right.

Lex loci protectionis

8

The Guideline reflects the approach that the
intellectual property rights are the outcome of
policy choices of States. Traditionally, industrial

“Existence” of an intellectual property right means
that the right is recognized as an exclusive right in a

1

Japanese Supreme Court, Hanrei Taimuzu, No. 1107, [2002],
p. 80.
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ownership. This paragraph applies mutatis
mutandis to related rights.

State. The issue of “validity” is a separate issue from
the existence. A right recognized as an exclusive
right may be challenged by certain stakeholders.
Issues such as who could do so, and under what
conditions fall under the issue of the validity.
“Registration”, as a requirement of the existence and
the validity of certain types of intellectual property
rights, includes not only substantial requirements,
but also procedural aspects as well as appeal
procedures in case of refusal. The “scope” concerns
to what extent the protection of an intellectual
property right reaches. Accordingly, exceptions
and limitations of intellectual property rights are
covered by this Guideline. For instance, if and to
what extent exhaustion is recognized; if and under
what conditions compulsory license2 of patents is
allowed; if there are general exceptions of copyright
protection such as fair use.3
9

(b) If the underlying policy of the law of the State
for which protection is sought so requires even
in international situations, the allocation of
rights which cannot be transferred or waived is
governed by the law of that State.
See as reference provisions
§§ 311-313 ALI Principles
Arts 3:201, 3:401-402, 3:503 CLIP Principles
Art 305 Transparency Proposal
Art 308 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

Short comments
10 For industrial property the Guidelines follow the
main territoriality based rule. In case of rights for
which registration is a constitutive factor, the State
for which protection is sought is the State where
the right is (to be) registered. The same applies
to industrial property rights that do not require
registration, such as unregistered design rights.

“Transferability” of an intellectual property right
should be separated from contractual arrangements.
Since transferability is an attribute of an intellectual
property right as proprietary right, while a contract
sets up the framework and detailed conditions of
the transfer of the intellectual property right.
Transferability implies that the link of the right to
personality aspect is marginal. The Guideline clarifies
its holistic stance toward proprietary aspects of an
intellectual property right by stating that “all other
matters concerning the right as such”.

11 Especially in case of employee made inventions
or designs, domestic laws often contain rules on
who (employee or employer) is entitled to claim
ownership of industrial property resulting from
labour, that is, who is entitled to file a registration.
Similar rules exist for designs and other industrial
property created under commission. Such rules in
effect address the relative position of parties that
are in a contractual relationship (employer and
employee, commissioning and commissioned party).
The principle of party autonomy is recognized as
a basic principle for contractual relations in these
Guidelines, and this is reflected in clause 1(b). It
provides for accessory allocation to the law that
governs a prior contractual relationship, for example
an employment contract.

Toshiyuki Kono
20. Initial Ownership and Allocation of Rights
(1) (a) Initial ownership in registered intellectual
property rights, unregistered trademarks and
unregistered designs is governed by the law of
the State for which protection is sought.
(b) In the framework of a contractual relationship,
in particular an employment contract or a
research and development contract, the law
applicable to the right to claim a registered
intellectual property right is determined in
accordance with Guidelines 21 to 23.

12 Clause 2(a) leads to identification of a single
applicable law to initial ownership of copyright,
but its approach also applies to performer’s
rights, phonogram producer’s rights and similar
unregistered related rights. All such rights arise as a
matter of law, in many States simultaneously. There
is therefore no easy way for parties to establish
who the owners are. The connecting factor used
is the law most closely connected to the creation.
To promote predictability as to the applicable law,
the presumption of clause 2(a) is that the place of
habitual residence of the actual “creator” (performer,
producer) has the closest connection. It is in that
jurisdiction that creation will typically take place.
Many works, performances and other protected
subject-matter result from a collaborative effort. If
those engaged are habitually resident in different
jurisdictions, the principal rule can be difficult to

(2) (a) Initial ownership in copyright is governed
by the law of the State with the closest connection
to the creation of the work. This is presumed to
be the State in which the person who created
the subject-matter was habitually resident at
the time of creation. If the protected subjectmatter is created by more than one person, they
may choose the law of one of the States of their
habitual residence as the law governing initial
2

Article 31 TRIPS.

3

§ 107 Title 17 of the United States Code.

1
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Single law for copyright and related rights

apply. The Guidelines therefore allow co-creators to
choose the applicable law, for instance because they
prefer legal certainty upfront.

14 In case of industrial property, the grant of a
registered right is intimately connected to a
jurisdiction’s specific procedures and intellectual
property institutions. What is more, who is the
initial owner of the rights can be inferred from the
relevant official registers. Copyright and related
rights arise by operation of law, simultaneously in a
large number of States. Applying the lex protectionis
to ownership of copyright and related rights, thus
produces legal uncertainty as to the chain of title.
To date the lex protectionis for matters of initial
ownership is the more common approach,4 but a
single law approach exists in various States.5 A single
applicable law promotes legal certainty. This has the
added advantage that it lowers transaction costs
for parties seeking to acquire intellectual property
rights or licenses. It also positively influences
the value of intellectual property rights as assets
because legal uncertainty about title may reduce
the economic value of intellectual property rights.
For these reasons the Guidelines establish a single
governing law for initial ownership of copyright and
related rights. The default connecting factor is the
place with the closest connection to the creation
of protected subject-matter.6 The reference is to

13 The single law approach can result in ownership of
rights being denied to parties which under domestic
law would qualify as initial owner (e.g. a person
making a minor creative contribution to a work, or
an employee). Especially where rights of authors and
performers are not transferable or cannot be waived
in the first place, this outcome may be unpalatable
for a State. If the policies underlying the domestic
intellectual property rules on transferability or
waiver are deemed crucial to uphold in international
cases, clause 2(b) allows for the territorially limited
application of the lex protectionis to initial ownership.
Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
Company A concentrates the design of its clothing
lines in State Z, and files applications for designs in all
States where it markets its products. The design law
of State Z provides that in case designs are created
by employees, the rights are vested with the actual
designer (natural person), unless otherwise agreed.
A’s chief designer B claims that under the laws of Z
she is entitled to all design rights. It follows from
Guideline 20(1)(a) that one must look to all the laws
of the States where design applications are filed to
determine which party has acquired the territorially
distinct rights involved. Note however that the right
to claim title to an intellectual property right should
be distinguished from actual (initial) ownership of
the intellectual property right itself. In Hypothetical
1 above, whether chief designer B or any of the
other employees involved in the creation of the
design in State Z are entitled to claim a right to file
for design rights in Z and elsewhere, depends on
the law applicable to the employment contract(s)
under Guideline 29(1)(b). If the law applicable to the
contract is not the law of the State where he/she is
habitually resident, the employee may still invoke
mandatory provisions of that law to secure a claim
to register as owner.
Hypothetical 2
An international videogame publisher established in
Y engages freelance game developers to contribute
to a videogame. Most developers work and live in
State Y, but a number work from and are resident
in States X and W. The law of State Y in this case
may be most closely connected to the creation,
so that law will govern the question whether the
developers from Y, X, and W qualify as (co-)authors
of the videogame. The developers may also agree
to have their respective positions governed by the
laws of X or W.
1
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4

See French Court of Cassation, 10 April 2013,
ECLI:FR:CCAS:2013:C100347 – Fabrice X v. ABC News
Intercontinental; German Supreme Court, Case I ZR 88/95, 2
October 1997, GRUR 1999, 152, 153 et seq. – Spielbankaffaire;
and for Korea Seoul High Court, Case No 2007Na0093, 8
July 2008, reported in Ghyohoo Lee, Choice of Law, in S.
Wolk, & K. Szkalej (Eds.), Employees’ Intellectual Property
Rights (AIPPI Law Series). Alphen aan den Rijn Netherlands:
Kluwer Law International. Note however that the Korean
Private international law act (Article 24) only provides that
infringement of rights is governed by the law of the place
of infringement. The High Court has extended the scope
of Article 24 to (initial) ownership. However, in a case on
allocation of rights by operation of law (i.e. the grant of
a license by operation of law to employer for employee
created works) the Korean Supreme Court later opted for
accessory allocation to the law governing the employment
contract: Korean Supreme Court, Case No. 2012 Ds 4763, 15
January 2015.

5

See for example for Portugal Article 48 Civil Code (private
international law section); for the US United States Court of
Appeals, Itar-Tass (153 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 1998) and its progeny,
including United States Court of Appeals, Alameda Films v.
Authors Rights Restorat, 331 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States Court of Appeals, Laparade v. Ivanova, 387 F.3d 1099
(9th Cir. 2004). Compare also Article 1256 of the Civil Code of
the Russian Federation.

6

For comparison: Both the Joint Korean-Japanese Principles
and the ALI Principles contain special rules aimed at
identifying a single applicable law for copyright and related
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domestic (intellectual property) law, excluding rules
of private international law (see also Guideline 30,
no renvoi).

In keeping with the principle of the closest
connection, what matters is the residence with the
overall stronger relationship.

Place of creation

Escape clause 21(2)b

15 The place of creation refers to the place where the
intellectual and organizational effort is made to
produce the intangible subject-matter. Often this
will coincide with the place where a work is first
published or its fixation or physical embodiment
is produced. Note however that the place where
physical copies are made (e.g. a print run of books,
production of clothing after a protected design) is not
necessarily the place of creation of the (intangible)
subject-matter.

19 Transferability of intellectual property is governed
by Guideline 19, the lex loci protectionis. In some
jurisdictions copyright is not transferable as a
matter of principle. In other States certain rights
cannot be waived. Examples are the author’s moral
right to resist mutilation of her work (cf. Article 6bis
Berne Convention) and remuneration rights for
certain acts of exploitation. Such rules are usually
intimately connected to the protection of persons
that the domestic law regards as “natural” first
owners. Application of a foreign law as the law of
the habitual residence of the creator, might result
in the designation of a different party as author than
domestic law would. So indirectly the domestic law
on transferability is bypassed. If domestic rules on
initial ownership of untransferable or unwaivable
rights are of an overriding mandatory nature, they
may be still be applied for local rights. Note that
this provision does not cover issues that may be
characterized more readily as contract law than
property law. In some States for example, a right
of the author to terminate an exploitation contract,
or a right to seek additional compensation in case of
unexpected commercial success will be characterized
as contractual.

Application to related rights
16 To keep the wording of the Guideline simple,
Article 2(a) uses terminology suited to copyrighted
subject-matter. The last sentence stresses that the
same single-law rule governs so-called related or
neighboring rights. The closest connection is to the
place of first performance for performer’s rights,
and to the place of production (and investment) for
rights in phonograms, broadcasts and (first fixations
of) films. Here too, the presumption is that the
habitual residence of the (legal) person(s) engaged
in the production or performance normally best
represents the closest connection.
17 Equivalent factors can be applied for (so far)
less universally recognized related rights, e.g. in
traditional cultural expressions, databases, sports
events, or press publications. As is the case with the
term “creation” for copyright works, “production”
should not be read as being equal to the place where
physical copies are made.

20 The fact that rules on transferability or waivability
are mandatory under local law is not in and of itself
enough to trigger clause b), this is what the wording
“even in international situations” expresses. Black
letter law may not explicitly address the question
of whether rules on initial ownership of rights that
cannot be transferred or waived claim application
in international cases, hence the reference to
underlying policy.

Temporal aspects
18 In many cases, authors and performers will have
stable habitual residences in one jurisdiction.
But when they do relocate to another State, the
Guidelines clarify that the relevant habitual
residence is the one at the time of creation (as
opposed to for example residence at the time
when a dispute arises over initial ownership). A
change of residence may occur during production.

Mireille van Eechoud

B. Contracts
21. Freedom of Choice
1. Parties may choose the law governing their
contractual relationship.

rights. These rules are drafted as cascading rules, with the
habitual residence of the creator(s) and the law chosen by
co-creators as important connecting factors. ALI Principles
has more rules more broadly for non-registered rights
such as neighboring rights of performers and (in a separate
rule) unregistered trademarks. The CLIP Principles also
depart from a multiple-governing law approach. The CLIP
Principles have important modifications to accommodate
work for hire and employment situations.

1

2. Such a choice of law shall not, however,
have the result of depriving the creator
or performer of the protection afforded to
him/her by the provisions that cannot be
derogated from by agreement under the law
that, in the absence of choice, would have
48
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been applicable pursuant to Guideline 22.

Hypothetical 2
A is a novelist who resides in State X. He signed a
publishing contract with a publisher also established
in State X for distribution of the novel in several
X-speaking States. The contract states that it is
governed by the law of State W (a non-X-speaking
State). To the extent that the contract presents a
closer nexus with State X (on the basis of Guideline
22), the choice of the law of State W cannot deprive
the author of the benefit of the more protective rules
in force in State X.

See as reference provisions
§ 315 (1) ALI Principles
Art 3:501 CLIP Principles
Art 306(2) Transparency Proposal

Short comments
21 Guideline 21 applies to contracts concerning
intellectual property rights the generally accepted
principle that the parties to a contract may
choose the law that governs the substance of their
agreement (lex contractus). Also known as “party
autonomy”, the parties’ freedom to choose the law
governing their contractual relationships embodies
the considerable trust that contemporary private
international law places in contracting parties
involved in international situations. As a principle,
they are considered to have the highest capacity and
legitimacy to solve conflict of laws regarding their
contracts. For instance, the Guideline’s absence of
geographic specification or limitation means that
the parties may choose any law; that law need not
be the lex loci protectionis.

Choice of law agreement
23 Guideline 21 articulates choice of law in light of the
other Guidelines. For instance Guideline 30 excludes
renvoi, which means that the substantive rules of the
law chosen by the parties apply, rather than that
State’s choice of law rules.
24 Guideline 21 does not take a position on whether
the parties may choose as the applicable “law” an
ensemble of non-state-based private ordering
norms.7 It is clear, however, that whether the
source of law derives from public norms or private
ordering, Guideline 21(2) requires the application of
the mandatory author-protective rules of the State
whose law Guideline 22 designates.

22 Without prejudice to the application of general
mandatory rules or the ordre public exception,
(Guidelines 28 and 29), the freedom of choice set
out in paragraph 1 of Guideline 21 nonetheless
encounters the particular limitation formulated in
paragraph 2. To the extent that the law that would
have applied in the absence of the parties’ choice
(the lex contractus identified in Guideline 22) includes
mandatory rules which afford greater protection
to the author or performer than provided by the
law chosen by the parties, these more protective
provisions shall govern. Paragraph 2 thus requires
comparing two sets of rules: the rules imposed by the
law the parties chose, and the rules of the objectively
applicable law (pursuant to Guideline 22), in order
to guarantee to the author or performer the benefit
of the rules that best protect their interests. This
comparative technique is directly inspired by the
Rome I Regulation, which employs it in the context
of contracts between professionals and consumers,
and in the context of employment contracts (as for
when the latter concern intellectual property, see
Guideline 23). In the same fashion, Guideline 21
treats the author and the performer as the “weaker
parties” who should receive special protection.

Scope of the chosen law
25 The law chosen by the parties governs only the
contractual aspects of their relationship. For
example, it is competent to determine whether the
parties validly consented to enter into the contract,
as well as the content of the contract, to specify
which contractual obligations were undertaken. As
such, general rules of interpretation are governed
by the lex contractus. Furthermore, the law chosen
by the parties shall fix the remedies in the event of
failure to execute the contract.
26 By contrast, the law the parties designate cannot
render an intellectual property right transferable
if, under the law for which the rights are granted
(the lex loci protectionis), the right is inalienable.
Nonetheless, the law that governs the contract can
provide that contractual clauses exclude certain
rights (which under the lex loci protectionis could have
been transferred) from the scope of the transfer.8
27 For other issues, it may be difficult to determine

Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
A grants B the patents he holds for States X, Y and
Z. The contract provides that contract issues will be
subject to the law of State W.
1

49

7

See for instance the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Contracts, 2016.

8

Creazioni Artistiche Musicali, S. R. L. v. Carlin Am., Inc., 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180431 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30 2016), aff’d., 747 Fed.
Appx. 3 (2nd Cir. August 23 2018).
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whether they are subject to the law chosen by
the parties (the lex contractus) or instead the lex
loci protectionis or even the lex fori. For example,
if a licensee exceeds the scope of the license and
engages in unauthorized acts of exploitation of a
work, should those exploitations be considered
copyright infringements governed by the lex loci
protectionis, or a breach of contract, governed by the
lex contractus?9 In fact, both the lex contractus and
the lex loci protectionis should apply, sequentially: the
lex contractus to determine whether the licensee has
breached the contract by exceeding its scope, and
if so, then the lex loci protectionis to determine the
extent of the infringement.

in modes of exploitation unknown at the time of
the contract’s conclusion. State laws may also allow
the author or performer to terminate the contract
if the grantee does not exploit the work, or after a
certain interval even if the work has been exploited
(reversion right).
30 The legal status of these measures may not always
rise to that of overriding mandatory rules (within
the meaning of Guideline 29), and even if they are
as a matter of domestic law, Guideline 29(2) does not
require the judge in the forum State to apply foreign
mandatory rules. In order to protect the interests
of authors and performers at the international
level, Guideline 21(2) reduces the complications of
characterization and guarantees the respect due to
mandatory rules so long as they emanate from the
State whose law would have applied if the parties
had not chosen the law to apply to their contract.

28 When State law ties ownership of an exclusive right
under copyright to standing to sue for infringement,
as is the case in the US, one may also inquire on what
grounds such a rule should apply. It is submitted that
such a rule must be part of the lex loci protectionis
(and not of the lex fori).10 Nonetheless, in the case
of a licensee, it becomes necessary to apply the lex
contractus in order to verify whether or not exclusive
rights were granted to him or her.

31 Nonetheless, there may be occasions to compare
these domestic mandatory rules and those of the
law chosen by the parties in order to determine
which are more author- or performer-protective.
The comparison, moreover, may not be obvious.

Mandatory protective provisions

32 Where the law that would have applied in the absence
of the parties’ choice proves more protective, it will
govern the parties’ relationship to the extent set
out by the State that enacted the mandatory rule.
Specifically, if that State determined to limit the
ambit of its mandatory rule to the territory of that
State (as is the case with the US Copyright Act’s non
waivable termination right), Guideline 21(2) would
not permit the rule to apply more broadly.

29 Some States protect the interests of creators and
performers through rules which impose particular
provisions or which give creators and performers
rights against the other contracting parties. For
example, rules which require in a mandatory fashion
that ambiguities be interpreted restrictively in
favor of authors and performers11, or which impose
proportional or just and equitable remuneration
for each mode of exploitation, or which require an
upward revision of the remuneration if the work
encounters unexpected success (so-called “best
seller clauses)12, or which prohibit the grant of rights
9

Compare Article 307(3) Joint Korean-Japanese Principles
with Article 3:606(2) CLIP Principles.

10

See Article 15 Rome II Regulation, [2007] OJ L199/40.

11

It should be presumed that a rule of interpretation
specifically and expressly enacted in favor of creators or
performers is mandatory according to the legal system it
belongs to. However this presumption can be reversed: see
German Supreme Court, I ZR 35/11, 24 September 2014, GRUR
2015, 264 – Hi Hotel II, holding that rules of interpretation
set out by German law for grants of copyright (§ 31(5)
German Copyright Act) are not internationally mandatory
because they are not mandatory on the internal level.

12
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22. Absence of Choice
1. In the absence of choice of law by the parties
pursuant Guideline 21, a contract other than
an employment contract shall be governed,
a) if the contract deals with intellectual
property granted for one State only, by
the law of this State, unless it is clear
from all the circumstances of the case that
the contract is manifestly more closely
connected with another State. Then the
law of that other State shall apply;
b) if the contract deals with intellectual
property granted for more than one
State, by the law of the State with which

See the “best-seller“ provision in Portugal (Article 49
Portuguese Copyright Act) and Germany (§§ 32, 32a and 32b
German Copyright Act). See also Article 20 Directive (EU)
2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital

Single Market, [2019] OJ L130/92, and amending Directives
96/9/EC, [1996] OJ L 77/20, and Article 20 Directive 2001/29/
EC, [2001] L167/10 (more generally, on the mandatory
provisions laid down by the Directive, see Recital 81).
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the contract is most closely connected; in
determining this State, the court shall take
into consideration among other possible
factors:
-

These connecting factors need not all apply in every
case, and they do not preclude taking other factors
into account.
36 In order to ensure the predictability of the law that
will apply to the contract, paragraph 2 of Guideline
22 fixes habitual residence as of the date of the
conclusion of the contract.

the common habitual residence of
the parties;
the habitual residence of the
party effecting the performance
characteristic of the contract;
the habitual residence of one of the
parties when this habitual residence
is located in one of the States covered
by the contract.

Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
A grants B the right to exploit his work (or his
trademark, or his patent or design) in State X. The
parties did not include a choice of law clause. It will
be governed by State X law, but if the parties both
habitually reside in State Y, and if payments under
the contract are to be made in State Y currency to
A’s account in a bank established in State Y, State Y
law will apply as the law of the State with which the
transaction is most closely connected.

2. For the purpose of this provision, the habitual
residence of a party shall be determined at
the time of conclusion of the contract.
See as reference provisions
§ 315 (2) ALI Principles
Art 3:502 CLIP Principles
Art 306(2) Transparency Proposals
Art 307 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

Hypothetical 2

Short comments

A grants B the right to exploit his work (or his
trademark, or his patent or design) in States X, Y
and Z. The parties did not include a choice of law
clause. To determine the governing law, it will be
necessary to take into account the parties’ habitual
residence, the residence of the party who furnishes
the characteristic performance (in this case, A, the
grantor), but also the currency, and revenue flows
(for example, from exploitations in multiple States
to a bank account in a single State) or the link the
contract, such as a franchising agreement, may have
with another contract whose governing law has been
established.

33 Guideline 22 addresses the case in which the
contracting parties have not chosen the law
applicable to their contract (apart from employment
contracts, which are the subject of Guideline 23).
Guideline 22 envisages two kinds of contracts,
depending on their geographic scope.
34 With respect to the first kind of contract, it
concerns only one State; its limited scope facilitates
the analysis of conflict of laws. Subsection a) of
paragraph 1 designates the law of the State for which
the rights which form the object of the contract are
granted, whatever the nationality or residence of the
parties may be. The law applicable to the contract
therefore coincides with the lex loci protectionis,
thus avoiding the prospect of differences between
the two laws. Guideline 22(1)(a), however, allows for
the possibility that the contract might present more
significant contacts with another State.

Closer and closest connections
37 When the contract’s geographic scope is limited to
a single State, Guideline 22(1)(a) presumes that it
presents the closest connection to that State. It is
nonetheless possible to present contrary proof that
is, to demonstrate that the contract is more closely
connected to another State.

35 With respect to the second kind of contract, the
intellectual property rights at issue cover multiple
territories. Subsection b) of paragraph 1 subjects the
contract to the law of the State with which it has the
most significant relationship; it also sets out several
connecting factors that assist in characterizing that
relationship: the habitual residence of the parties in
the same State; the habitual residence of the party
who must furnish the characteristic performance;
the habitual residence of either one of the parties if it
is located in one of the States covered by the contract.

1

38 When the contract covers multiple States, or
indeed, the whole world, the connection to any one
State may be weaker. In that situation Guideline
22(1)(b) provides no presumption. It therefore
becomes necessary to determine the State with
which the contract is most closely connected. To
that end, Guideline 22 enumerates several relevant
connecting factors, starting from habitual residence.
The enumeration is illustrative, not limitative. Other
connecting factors may be taken into account, so
long as they are based on elements known to both
parties and are established by the time of the
51
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40 To enable the identification of a single law, the
residence of the party furnishing the characteristic
performance supplies the relevant connecting factor,
rather than the State(s) in which the characteristic
performance is rendered.

conclusion of the contract. For example, a relevant
point might be the choice of a particular currency, or
of the State in which the payments are to be made,
or of the relationship of the contract to another
contract entered into by the same parties (for
example, a license agreement that implements a
broader cooperation agreement among the parties).
Other elements, such as the language of the contract
or the presence of a choice of forum clause, may be
taken into account when they reinforce certain of
the abovementioned connecting factors.

41 As it is not always possible to identify the
characteristic performance (that is, to determine
whether one party’s performance is more
important than the other), Guideline 22(1)(b) does
not designate the habitual residence of the party
furnishing the characteristic performance as the
presumptively applicable law (when it is possible
to identify that performance), but rather as one of
several connecting factors to be taken into account.

All of these elements may also be employed to rebut
the presumption of Guideline 22(1)(a).
Performance characteristic of the contract

Marie-Elodie Ancel, Jane C Ginsburg

39 The reference to the contract’s characteristic
performance is borrowed from the Rome I
Regulation.13 It requires identifying the most
important performance of the contract, that which
expresses the function or the economic dynamic of
the agreement. When a party simply pays a fixed
sum to another party, the second party is usually
considered the one who renders the characteristic
performance. For example, in a contract assigning
several patents for a fixed sum, the grantor is the
party who furnishes the characteristic performance,
which is the transfer of the industrial property rights.
Similarly, if a work is commissioned to an author,
he will be the one rendering the characteristic
performance of the contract. But the economy of
intellectual property contracts may be more complex.
For instance, when the remuneration of the holder of
the right granted depends on the results of the other
contracting party’s activity, that activity represents
a particular economic value and may constitute the
characteristic performance of the contract. Thus,
when a patent holder grants the right to exploit his
patents in several States and must, by virtue of the
contract, receive a remuneration proportional to the
licensee’s revenues, the grantee’s exploitation may
appear to supply the characteristic performance. For
the same reasons when a publisher has undertaken
the obligation to exploit and promote the intellectual
property right in the interest of the author, he is to
be seen as the characteristic performer.14
13

Article 4(2) Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6. Compare
with Article 3:502(2) CLIP Principles. See also Article
1211(1) of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

14

German Supreme Court, I ZR 218/53, 22 November 1955, GRUR
1956, 135 –“Sorell and Son” about a book publishing contract;
German Supreme Court, I ZR 182/98, 29 March 2001, GRUR
2001, 1134 – “Lepo Sumera”, about a music publishing contract.
See also Hungarian Supreme Court, 6 October 1995, Pf.IV.
22284/1994/3 [1998] GRUR Int 1998, 74 (German translation);
Paris Court of Appeal, 2 June 1999, [1/2000] RIDA 302.

1

23. Employment Contracts
1. An employer and its employee whose efforts
give rise to an intellectual property right may
choose the law governing their contractual
relationship in accordance with Guideline 21.
Such a choice of law shall not, however, have
the result of depriving the employee of the
protection afforded to him by the provisions
that cannot be derogated from by agreement
under the law that, in the absence of choice,
would be applicable pursuant to paragraphs
2 and 3.
2. In the absence of choice of law by the
parties, the contractual relationship between
employer and employee shall be governed by
the law of the State in which or, failing that,
from which the employee habitually carries
out his work in performance of the contract.
3. The State where the work is habitually carried
out shall not be deemed to have changed if
the employee is temporarily employed in
another State. Where it is clear from all the
circumstances of the case that the contract
is more closely connected with a State other
than that indicated in paragraph 2, the law
of that other State shall apply.
See as reference provisions
§§ 311 (2), 312 (2), 313 (1)(c) and (2) ALI Principles
Art 3:503 CLIP Principles
Art 25(2), 308(4) Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

Short comments
42 Guideline 23(1) recognizes party autonomy in
terms of choice of law in an individual employment
contract. In this context, Guideline 23 does not
provide a definition of employment contract. It
leaves to the competent court to determine whether
52
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a contract is characterized as an employment
contract as a preliminary question. In other
words, characterization as to whether a contract
constitutes an employment contract is up to the
forum State. The law chosen by the parties shall not
have the consequence of depriving the employee
of the protection afforded to him or her by the
mandatory employment regulations of the State
in which or from which the employee habitually
carries out his or her work in performance of the
contract (lex loci laboris). Neither shall the law chosen
by the parties have the consequence of depriving
the employee of the protection afforded to him
or her by the mandatory employment regulations
of a different State in exceptional circumstances
when the contract is more closely connected with
the different State from the one in which or from
which the employee habitually carries out his work
in performance of the contract.

the law of the State of the place of business through
which the employee was engaged will be taken into
account.
Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
A, a producer of diagnostic medical instruments and a
habitual resident of State X, brought an action before
a court of State Y against A’s former employee B, a
habitual resident of State Y, for patent infringement,
alleging that B applied for and obtained a patent for
the same diagnostic medical instruments in State Y.
B argued that the invention was made before his/her
employment contract with A whereas A claimed it
was made in the course of his/her employment. The
employment contract designated the law of State X
as its governing law. The law of State X, which was
the law chosen by A and B, will determine whether
A can claim any rights arising of the contract under
Guideline 23(1).

43 Guidelines 23(2) and (3) are the fall-back provisions
in the absence of choice of law made by the parties.
Guideline 23(2) prescribes that, in the absence of a
choice of law made by the parties, the individual
employment contract shall be governed by the
law of the State in which the employee habitually
carries out his work in performance of the contract.
In this regard, the State where the work is habitually
carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if
the employee is temporarily employed in another
State. Otherwise, the applicable law could be
changed by sending an employee to work in another
State. In cases in which no habitual place of work
can be identified, the law of the State from which
the employee habitually carries out his or her work
in performance of the contract.

However, B worked in State Y, as an employee
and he has a mandatory right to non-exclusive
remuneration for invention under the law of State Y.
Under Guideline 23(1) second sentence, application
of the law of State X shall not have the result of
depriving B of the mandatory right to non-exclusive
remuneration afforded to him/her by the law of
State Y.
Hypothetical 2
An employee A, a habitual resident of State X, has
been employed in State Y by a pharmaceutical
product company B of State Z. A has worked for
B for the last 5 years in State Y. The employment
agreement did not contain how much remuneration
A would be paid for his invention made in the course
of employment with B. In terms of the remuneration
issue, the law of state Y shall apply under Guideline
23(2) sentence 1.

44 Guideline 23(2) sentence 2 will apply to the
cases where the employee is expected to resume
working in the State of origin after carrying out
his work abroad for a limited period of time.
45 Due to the high threshold (“more closely” connection
standard), Guideline 23(3) will apply to exceptional
cases only. This provision makes it possible to deviate
from the law of the State in which or from which the
employee habitually carries out his/her work.

If A worked for the last 2 months in State X
and returned to State Y, the law governing the
remuneration issue is the law of state Y pursuant to
Guideline 23(2) sentence 2.

46 Guideline 23 does not provide which country’s law
applies to cases where the law of the State in which
or, failing that, from which the employee habitually
carries out their work in performance of the contract
cannot be determined. However, it is based on the
assumption that the closest connection test should
be applied to those situations. If it is impossible
to determine a State in which or from which the
employee habitually carries out his or her work,

1

Party autonomy principle
47 Guideline 23 does not define the employment
contract. In this context, it will leave doors open
for a court of the forum State to determine whether
a contract is characterized as an employment
contract as a preliminary question. In other words,
characterization as to whether a contract constitutes
an employment contract is up to the forum State.

53

2021

Kyoto Guidelines: Applicable Law
48 Guideline 23(1) is modeled after Article 3:503 (1) of
CLIP Principles. These provisions are very much
influenced by Article 8 of the EU Rome I Regulation.

of the Rome I Regulation and Article 3:503 (2) of CLIP
Principles. Apart from party autonomy principle,
Guideline 23(2) sentence 1 provides for functional
allocation, i.e., the law applied to the employment
contract is the law of the State where the employee
habitually works.

49 Guideline 23(1) recognizes party autonomy in
terms of choice of law in an individual employment
contract, for the interpretation of the contract15 and
for determining its effect,16 while prohibiting such
a choice of law from having the result of depriving
the employee of the protection afforded him/her
by provisions that cannot be derogated from by
agreement17 under the law applicable pursuant to
the following fall-back provisions.

51 In this regard, the State where the work is habitually
carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if
they are temporarily employed in another State.19
Otherwise, the applicable law may be changed by
sending an employee to work in another State.
In cases in which no habitual place of work can
be identified, the law of the State from which
the employee habitually carries out his work in
performance of the contract.

Fall-back provisions in the absence of choice of law
50 Guidelines 23(2) and (3) provide the fall-back
provisions in the absence of choice of law made by
the parties.18 Guideline 23(2) sentence 1 prescribes
that, in the absence of a choice of law made by the
parties, the individual employment contract shall be
governed by the law of the State in which or, failing
that, from which the employee habitually carries out
their work in performance of the contract. Guideline
23(2) sentence 1 is identical to Article 8(2) sentence 1
15

CJEU, C-64/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:551 – Anton Schlecker v Melitta
Josefa Boedeker; § 45 (holding that Article 6(2) of Rome I
Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6, “must be interpreted as
meaning that, even where an employee carries out the
work in performance of the contract habitually, for a
lengthy period and without interruption in the same State,
the national court may, under the concluding part of that
provision, disregard the law of the State where the work is
habitually carried out, if it appears from the circumstances
as a whole that the contract is more closely connected
with another State”); CJEU, C-29/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:151
- Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; § 51
(Article 6 (2)(a) of Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6,
must be construed “as meaning that, in a situation in
which an employee carries out his activities in more than
one Contracting State, the State in which the employee
habitually carries out his work in performance of the
contract, within the meaning of that provision, is that in
which or from which, in the light of all the factors which
characterize that activity, the employee performs the
greater part of his obligations towards his employer.”).

16

The Korean Supreme Court, Case No. 2012 Da 4763, 15 January
2015, which held that the grant of a free non-exclusive license
to an employer by operation of law would be governed by
the law applicable to the employment relationship. Its
lower court decision was the judgment rendered by Seoul
High Court, Case No. 2011 Na 20210, 8 December 2011.

17

Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Howard v Nitro-Lift Technologies,
L.L.C., 2011 OK 98, 273 P. 3d 20, 331 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 902 [2011],
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3647 [U.S. May 14, 2012].

18

1

52 Guideline 23(2) sentence 2 will be applied to the cases
where the employee is expected to resume working
in the State of origin after carrying out his works
abroad. In this context, the conclusion of a new
employment contract with the original employer
or an employer belonging to the same group of
companies as the original employer should not bar
the employee from being considered as carrying out
his tasks in another State temporarily. The decisive
factor in terms of Guideline 23(2) sentence 2 is the
intention of the parties (animus retrahendi).
Exception Clause
53 Due to the high threshold (“more close” connection
standard), Guideline 23(3) will apply to exceptional
cases only.
54 According to Guideline 23(3), where it is clear from
all the circumstances of the case that the contract is
more closely connected with a State other than the
law of the State in which or, failing that, from which
the employee habitually carries out his or her work
in performance of the contract, the law of that other
State shall apply.20
55 For example, this exception clause is applicable to
the right to claim a patent right in case of several coinventors who are habitually employed in different
States. In order to avoid applying several different
laws to the right, the initial owner of the right
should be identified in accordance with the closest
connection test under Guideline 23(3). The governing
law will ordinarily be the law of the State where the
center of gravity of the inventive activity is situated
or, as the least preferable option, to the State of
the habitual residence of the employer. In another
example, when it comes to assignment or license
of international property rights, the employment

Cf. Article 8 Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6.

54

19

Article 8(2) 2 of Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6.

20

Article 8(4) of Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6.
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be interpreted more broadly.24

contract is presumed to be most closely connected
to the State in which the assignor or the licensor
resided at the time of the execution of the contract.21

Gyooho Lee
24. Formal Validity

56 Guideline 23(3) is reserved for exceptional cases, so
that courts can apply it only in special circumstances.
Some factors to be taken into account as relevant
circumstances of the case include the nationality and
location of the parties, the language and currency
used in the contract, and the existence of previous
employment contracts between the parties.22
Guideline 23(3) does not allow the seeking of the
most favorable solutions for the employee from the
perspective of substantive law.

1. Any contract dealing with intellectual
property rights shall be formally valid
to the extent that it satisfies the formal
requirements:
a) of the law of the State which governs the
contract pursuant Guidelines 21-23, or
b) of the law of the State in which either of
the parties has its habitual residence at
the time of the conclusion of the contract,
or

57 Guideline 23 does not provide what law is applied
to cases where the law of the State in which or,
failing that, from the employee habitually carries
out their work in performance of the contract
cannot be determined.23 However, it is based on the
assumption that the closest connection test should
be applied to those situations. If it is impossible
to determine a State in which or from which the
employee habitually carries out his or her work,
the law of the State of the place of business through
which the employee was engaged will be taken into
account.

c) of the law of any other State with which
the contract is connected.
2. This provision shall not deprive creators,
performers and employees of the protection
resulting from Guideline 21 paragraph 2 and
Guideline 23, paragraph 1.
See as reference provisions:
§ 315 ALI Principles
Art 3:504 CLIP Principles
Art 306(4) Transparency Proposals

Public Policy or Mandatory Rules
58 Guidelines 23(1) enforces the mandatory employment
regulations of the State in which or from which
the employee habitually carries out his/her work
in performance of the contract (lex loci laboris), or
of another State where has more connected with
the State in which or from which the employee
habitually carries out his/her work in performance
of the contract. Some good illustrative examples
are mandatory provisions applied to employees for
employee inventions and mandatory remuneration
for employee inventions. The phase “provisions
which cannot be derogated from by agreement”
should be differentiated from the term “overriding
mandatory provisions” in Guideline 29 and should
21

§ 315(2)(2) ALI Principles.

22

A place of residence in the other State turned out to be
insufficient to repeal the law of the State in which the
employee habitually carries out his work in the English
case of Shekar v Satyam Computer Services (2005 ICR 737).

23

Article 8(3) Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6, providing that, where the law of the State in which or,
failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out their work in performance of the contract cannot be determined, the contract shall be governed
by the law of the State where the place of business
through which the employee was engaged is situated.

1

Short comments
59 In order to avoid invalidating contracts for defects
of form, Guideline 24(1) provides several alternative
connecting factors. These are, on the one hand, in (a),
the law that governs the substance of the contract,
as determined under the prior Guidelines; on the
other hand, under (b) and (c), more circumstantial
elements: the State in which each party habitually
resides; or any other State with which the contract
presents a connection.
60 Guideline 24(2) nonetheless constrains this
very open-ended approach to formal validity.
Certain formal requirements, such as the
detailed specification of the remuneration, or the
specification of modes of exploitation of works of
authorship have a particularly strong connection to
the substantive law governing the agreement, and
are intended to protect the author or performer.
These requirements must be respected if they are
mandated by the State whose law Guideline 21(2)
and Guideline 23(1) designate.

24

55

Recital 37 of the Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L 177/6. See
Guideline 29.
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Extended comments

have specifically chosen a particular place in which
to conclude and sign the contract, that place may
have a relevant connection to the agreement.

Hypothetical 1

Formal requirements intended to protect authors and
performers

By virtue of the law that applies to the contract
entered into between A and B, which is also the law
of State X where A habitually resides, the agreement
should have been notarized, which it was not.
Nonetheless, B habitually resides in State Y whose
law merely requires that the contract be in writing
and signed by both parties, which is the case for
A and B’s agreement. Had there been no writing,
it might nonetheless be possible to validate the
contract if one of the other laws set out in Guideline
24(1) would validate a purely oral agreement.

63 Following up on the protection guaranteed by
Guideline 21(2) and Guideline 23(1), Guideline 24(2)
guarantees the application of the more protective
formal rules of the State whose law would apply
to the contract in the absence of a choice of law
clause. In such cases, it is unnecessary to assess
whether these requirements constitute overriding
mandatory rules within the meaning of Guideline
29; it suffices that they be more protective of the
interests of authors and performers, whether or not
they are employees, than the rules of formal validity
Guideline 24(1)’s multiple connecting factors would
otherwise designate. Moreover, thanks to Guideline
24(2), the international regime of more protective
laws aligns with the regime of more protective
laws governing the substance of the contract.
The distinction between form and substance thus
disappears, obviating the need to litigate whether
a particular rule goes to a contract’s form or its
substance.

Hypothetical 2
The contract concluded between author and
publisher A and B concerns a single State X, whose
law would apply by virtue of Guideline 22(1)(a).
However, they have chosen the law of State Y to
govern their contractual relationship, as Guideline
21 permits. The law of State Y does not require that
a grant of rights in future technologies be explicit.
By contrast, under the law of State X, such a grant
must be specifically stated. A may claim the benefit
of this protective formal rule.

Marie-Elodie Ancel, Jane C Ginsburg

Alternative connecting factors

C. Infringements

61 Consistently with a widespread approach,25 Guideline
24(1) enumerates different connecting factors
in order to increase the chances that one of the
designated laws will validate the form of the contract.
One connecting factor on which the Guidelines do not
rely is the State in which the parties were present at
the time of the contract’s conclusion. If this location
has any significant bearing on the transaction, it will
come within the general criterion of “any other State
with which the contract is connected”. Setting out
the place of the parties’ presence as an autonomous
point of attachment, however, risks subjecting the
validity of the form of the contract to the law of a
State with which the transaction has no meaningful
connection. For example, party A could be in the
Dubai airport on a stopover from New York to
Singapore when, using Skype, A concludes a contract
dealing with a Brazilian trademark with B, a French
citizen, who is on a skiing holiday in Switzerland
when she participates in the Skype call.

25. Basic Rule on Infringement
1. The law applicable to the infringement of an
intellectual property right is the law of each
State for which protection is sought.
2. The law applicable to the remedies for the
infringement may be chosen by the parties.
See as reference provisions
§§ 301-302 ALI Principles
Arts 3:601, 3:602, 3:605, 3:606 CLIP Principles
Arts 301, 303, 304 Transparency Proposal
Arts 304-305 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

Short comments
64 Guideline 25 lays down an internationally accepted
rule of lex loci protectionis that requires subjecting
intellectual property infringements to the law of the
State for which protection is sought. It is the same
rule that applies to proprietary aspects of intellectual
property disputes (Guideline 19). Lex loci protectionis
reflects the territorial nature of intellectual property
rights, and implies that different States’ laws may
define intellectual property right infringements

62 Guideline 24(1)(c) therefore refers to the law of any
other State with which the contract has a connection.
Such a State could be the one for which rights are
granted, or of another contract between the parties
to which the current contract is related. If the parties
25

1

See also Article 11 Rome I Regulation, [2008] OJ L177/6.
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in different ways, which may lead to different
outcomes in a cross-border intellectual property
infringement case. This rule should be distinguished
from the lex fori rule which subjects intellectual
property infringement to the law of the State where
the infringement is litigated.

whereby a right holder enjoys multiple national
intellectual property rights that exist in different
States independently. Even in case of unregistered
rights, such as copyright, the territoriality principle
suggests that there is no single universal copyright
in a work; rather, copyright in each State exists
separately and, therefore, cross-border infringement
of copyright should be adjudicated in each protecting
State independently. The underlying rationale
of this rule is that each State has sovereignty to
determine the scope of intellectual property rights
and the consequences of their infringement. A
similar applicable law rule for intellectual property
infringements could be found in many national and
regional laws (e.g., the EU Rome II Regulation27) and
all predecessor projects.

65 Guideline 25 also sets an exception to the
territoriality principle. It allows parties to choose
law applicable to the remedies for the infringement.
This rule is meant to provide more discretion for the
parties to the dispute and increase efficiency of the
proceedings. This party autonomy rule is limited as
it applies to the remedies for the infringement only,
and does not apply to other infringement-related or
proprietary issues.
Extended comments

Scope of lex loci protectionis
67 It could be implied from Guideline 25(1) that lex
loci protectionis applies to all infringement-related
issues, such as existence of the infringement, extent
of liability, limitations on liability, remedies and
others. While the Guideline does not list all issues
that are covered by the “infringement”, such lists
are available under some national and regional
laws.28 As indicated earlier, the lex loci protectionis
rule also applies when determining the existence,
scope and transferability of the right (see Guideline
19). In contrast, initial ownership of the right and
ubiquitous infringements are determined under
separate sets of rules (see Guidelines 20 and 26
respectively).

Hypothetical 1
Patent holder A situated in State X has patent rights
over an invention in States Y and Z. Company
B established in state Y infringes A‘s rights by
producing an infringing product in State Y and
selling it in States Y and Z. A may choose to sue B in
State Y, B‘s domicile, and claim an infringement both
in States Y and Z (see international jurisdiction rule
under Guideline 3). In such a case, State Y’s court will
have to apply Y‘s and Z‘s laws to determine whether
there is an infringement and what remedies are
available in each State separately.
Hypothetical 2

Party autonomy as an exception to territoriality

Company A situated in State X has copyright on a
film. Company A has a contract with a distribution
company B situated in State Y that assigned company
B film distribution rights for the territory of State
Y. The contract States that all disputes arising out
of or related to the contract, including disputes
related to any possible future right infringements,
are governed by the law of State X. B starts making
and distributing copies of A‘s film in State Z. A sues B
in State Y (B‘s domicile) for copyright infringement
occurring in State Z. Although the infringement will
have to be adjudicated under Z‘s law as the law of
the State for which protection is sought, remedies
may be determined under State‘s X law as the law
chosen by the parties.

68 Party autonomy that is implemented in Guideline
25(2) is an exception to the territoriality principle
and the lex loci protectionis rule. Namely, parties
are allowed to choose a single law that applies to
remedies in a single-state or multi-state intellectual
property infringement. The rationale of this rule is
that parties to the intellectual property infringement
dispute, like in any other tort case without broader
public interest, should be given certain discretion
how to deal with the legal dispute. Hence, they should
be able to choose law that will govern at least the
remedies in the case. Reducing the number of laws
that have to be applied to determine remedies in
different States allows a more efficient adjudication
of multi-state intellectual property disputes.
Traditionally, due to a strict territorial approach to
intellectual property rights, choice of law by parties
has not been possible in disputes over intellectual

Territoriality and a “Mosaic Approach”
66 Lex loci protectionis rule provided for in Guideline
25(1) mirrors the territoriality principle which
underlies intellectual property rights and that could
be implied from international intellectual property
treaties.26 It leads to a so called “Mosaic Approach”
26

1

literary and artistic works (1886).

See e.g. Article 5(2) Berne Convention for the protection of
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Article 8(1) Rome II Regulation, [2007] OJ L199/40.

28

See e.g. Article 15 Rome II Regulation, [2007] OJ L199/40.
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Choice of parties can be overridden

property rights.29 However, some national laws allow
parties to choose the law in intellectual property law
disputes,30 and all predecessor projects suggested
introducing party autonomy in intellectual property
disputes, although to a slightly different extent.31

71 Despite a limited party autonomy allowed under this
rule, parties‘ choice of law may still lead to results
that are not compatible with forum‘s public policy
or mandatory rules (e.g. punitive damages available
in some jurisdictions might be seen as incompatible
with public policy in some jurisdictions). In such a
case, courts may rely on public policy and mandatory
rules set in the Guidelines (Guidelines 28 and 29) and
deny the application of law chosen by the parties.

Exercise and limits of party autonomy
69 Parties are free to choose the law applicable to the
remedies at any point in time. Since the Guideline
does not restrict the time when the choice could be
made, it could be made before or after the dispute
arises (e.g. in a pre-existing contract).

Rita Matulionyte

70 According to Guideline 25(2), party autonomy
in intellectual property disputes is limited to
the kinds of redress for injury. Parties are able
to choose applicable law to remedies only. This
includes injunctions, damages and other sanctions,
such as seizure and destruction of infringing goods,
although procedural aspects shall be subject to the
lex fori. For all other matters, such as existence of the
right, its scope and transferability, initial ownership
as well as all other issues related to the infringement
(e.g. third party liability, limitation of liability and
others), parties cannot choose the applicable law.
With relation to these issues, respective applicable
law rules prescribed under these Guidelines will
have to apply. All predecessor projects also adopt
restrictions with regard to party autonomy in
intellectual property disputes.32

29

E.g. EU Rome II Regulation, [2007] OJ L199/40, does not
allow such choice either, see Article 8(3) Rome II Regulation.

30

E.g. Article 110(2) Swiss Federal Code on Private International
Law and Article 50 China‘s Law on the Laws Applicable to
Civil Relationships Involving a Foreign Element Foreignrelated Civil Relations. Concerning the application of this
provision, see Xiang Weiren v Peng Lichong (“Drunken
Lotus”), [2015] Jing Zhi Min Zhong Zi 1814, applying Chinese
law to infringements occurring in Germany and Russia
on the basis that the parties agreed on the application of
the law of the forum. Full text of the case can be found
here (in Chinese): http://pkulaw.cn/case_es/payz_
a25051f3312b07f3119ba99f8e37a1268f07b2edd50f2343bdfb.
html?match=Exact

31

See § 302 ALI Principles; Article 3:606 CLIP Principles; Article
304 Transparency Proposals; Article 302 Joint KoreanJapanese Principles.

32

See § 302 ALI Principles; Article 3:606 CLIP Principles;
Article 304 Transparency Proposal; Article 302 Joint KoreanJapanese Principles.

1

26. Law Applicable to Ubiquitous or Multi-state
Infringements
1. When the infringement in multiple States
is pleaded in connection with the use of
ubiquitous or multinational media, the court
may apply to the infringement as a whole
the law or laws of the State(s) having an
especially close connection with the global
infringement. Relevant factors to determine
the applicable law (or laws) in these situations
include:
-

the place where the harm caused by
the infringement is substantial in
relation to the infringement in its
entirety;

-

the parties’ habitual residences or
principal places of business;

-

the place where substantial activities
in furthering the infringement have
been carried out.

2. In situations where paragraph (1) is applied,
any party may prove that, with respect to
particular States covered by the action, the
solution provided by any of those States’ laws
differs from that obtained under the law(s)
chosen to apply to the case as a whole. The
court must take into account such differences
when fashioning the remedy.
3. Paragraphs (1) and (2) above may apply
mutatis mutandis in cases of secondary
or indirect infringements of intellectual
property rights.
See as reference provisions
§§ 301-302, 321 ALI Principles
Arts 3:603, 3:604 CLIP Principles
Art 302 Transparency Proposal
Art 306 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles
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adjudicating multi-state infringements by applying
a single applicable law, instead of multiple laws of
several States.

72 Guideline 26 sets a new applicable law rule
for infringements occurring via ubiquitous or
multinational media, such as the Internet. It suggests
that such ubiquitous or multinational infringements
could be adjudicated under a single law with an
especially close connection to the dispute. It departs
from the territoriality principle and abandons the
requirement that a multi-state infringement shall be
subject to the law of each protecting State separately.

75 The purpose of the rule is to facilitate the adjudication
of multi-state infringements which otherwise would
be subject to multiple national laws. In particular,
it applies in cases where infringements occur when
using ubiquitous or multinational media, such as
the Internet. In such an environment, intellectual
property rights can be simultaneously infringed in
a number of jurisdictions and enforcing these rights
by applying a traditional territorial approach is
impracticable, if possible at all. Such infringements
are most frequent with relation to copyright which is
automatically protected in all Berne Union Member
States33 and is easily infringed in all of these States.
This rule might be particularly relevant in prima facie
copyright infringement cases (e.g. straightforward
copyright “piracy” cases) but might be little
useful in less straightforward cases (e.g. involving
the interpretation and application of copyright
exceptions). Single-law approach could also be
applied with relation to multi-state trademark
infringements online, e.g. when a trademark is
registered in multiple States, or with relation to
trade marks that are protected under national laws
without registration.

73 The purpose of this rule is to facilitate the
enforcement of global intellectual property
infringements and ensure that remedies for the
entire global infringement could be granted under
a single applicable law. At the same time, the
Guideline contains an exception that allows parties
to invoke another law that provides a different
outcome to the dispute. This establishes a balance
between territoriality and universality approaches
in ubiquitous infringement cases. The rule can also
be applied to indirect or secondary infringements.
Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
A, who resides in State X, owns rights into a song.
The song was uploaded without authorization
on B‘s website and became accessible for free in
essentially all States around the world. B resides and
B‘s business is registered in State Y. B‘s website is in
English and its users primarily come from Englishspeaking States, such as State X, where A‘s songs
are best known. A sues B in State Y, B‘s domicile,
and requests the court to adjudicate the entire
multi-state dispute under the law of State X. X‘s law
arguably has an especially close connection with a
dispute since significant harm occurred in State X
when users originating in State X downloaded the
song, and at least one party resides in State X.

A single law with an “especially close connection”
76 The law that applies to adjudicate the entire multistate dispute is the law that has “an especially close
connection” with the infringement. An especially
close connection rule has been chosen as a flexible
rule that helps to avoid “forum shopping” and “race
to the bottom” problems that other more specific
rules would cause (such as lex fori or lex loci delicti).
The Guideline provides a non-exhaustive list of
factors that should be taken into account when
determining which law has a sufficiently close
connection, such as a place of substantial harm,
parties’ habitual residence or a place of business, and
place of substantial activities. The court will have to
take all relevant circumstances into account in order
to determine which State has an especially close
connection to the dispute. If the dispute appears to
have an equally close connection to several States,
several laws might apply to different parts of a multistate infringement.

State‘s X law allows additional (punitive) damages.
As State‘s Y law does not allow additional damages,
B can claim that State‘s Y law, if applied, would lead
to a different result. The court may take this into
account and reduce damages in proportion to a
number of users who accessed the song from State Y.
Ubiquitous infringements and a single-law approach

Limits of a single-law approach

74 Guideline 26(1) subjects ubiquitous intellectual
property infringements to a single applicable law and
thereby establishes an exception to the territoriality
principle. The rule proposed in this Guideline is novel
and has not been adopted in any national, regional
or international laws yet. However, all predecessor
projects contained a single-law approach that allows

1

77 Guideline 26(1) is meant to apply in situations where
respective intellectual property laws are similar
in all States covered by the claim and therefore
it is very likely that the infringement would be
33
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Signatories of the Berne Convention for the protection of
literary and artistic works (1886).

2021

Kyoto Guidelines: Applicable Law
right holders, vis-à-vis a collective rights
management organization, such as

established under each law separately. When this is
not the case, Guideline 26(2) sets an exception to the
rule. It allows any party to argue that the State other
than the one with an especially close connection
has different laws on the matter (e.g. has broader
or narrower copyright exceptions, different liability
rules or remedies available). The court is required to
take into account such differences in fashioning the
remedy (e.g. by excluding a particular State from an
injunction or reducing damages accordingly).

(i) the right and conditions for becoming
a member of this organization;
(ii) the
right
and
conditions
for entrusting rights to this
organization;
(iii) the rights and conditions for
withdrawing the management of
rights from this organization;

78 In addition, Guideline 26 “allows” but does not
“require” the courts to apply the ubiquitous
infringement rule. This means that the general
rule of lex loci protectionis (Guideline 25(1)) may
also be applied for the adjudication of ubiquitous
infringements. If the court finds that a single-law
approach proposed by the ubiquitous infringement
rule is not suitable for a particular infringement
occurring over ubiquitous media, the court may
resort to a traditional lex loci protectionis rule
and adjudicate the dispute under the law of each
protecting State separately.

(iv) the requirements regarding the
calculation and distribution of
the organization’s revenue to the
right holders and other collective
rights management organizations
representing right holders; and
(v) the rights and conditions on access
to alternative dispute resolution to
be offered by the collective rights
management organization; and

Secondary infringements may be subject to a singlelaw approach

c) in absence of a choice of law by the parties,
the contract under which the right holder
entrusts rights to this organization.

79 Guideline 26 may also be applied in case of secondary
or indirect infringements. However, applying a
single-law approach to such infringements might
be more difficult since liability for secondary
or indirect infringements is not internationally
or regionally harmonized. It is more likely to
be applied in straight-forward (prima facie)
intellectual property infringement cases. Notably,
the ubiquitous infringement rule was extended to
secondary or indirect infringements only in some
of the predecessor projects,34 while the remaining
predecessor projects did not address this complicated
matter at all.

2. The law of the State for which protection is
sought shall govern
a) the presumption that a collective rights
management organization is empowered
to seek protection for certain works or
subject-matter of related rights;
b) mandatory collective rights management;
c) the power of an individual collective
rights management organization to grant
licenses or collect statutory remuneration
without prior consent of the right holder;

Rita Matulionyte
27. Collective Rights Management in the Field of
Copyright and Related Rights

34

1

1. The law of the State where a collective rights
management organization has its actual seat
of administration shall govern

d) the issue of whether and under which
conditions a collective rights management
organization has to license rights to users;
and

a) the requirements for the specific corporate
structure of collective rights management
organizations;

e) the requirements regarding the
calculation of the royalty rates and
statutory remuneration.

b) the rights, conditions and principles
concerning the relationship of the right
holder, as well as of another collective rights
management organization representing

3. The law of the forum shall govern legal
standing of a collective right management
organization before a court.
4. This guideline applies without prejudice to
the applicable competition law rules.

See Article 3:604 CLIP Principles.
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Since right holders can freely decide whether they
prefer to mandate the management of their rights
to the local CMO or a foreign CMO, cross-border
competition among CMOs should sufficiently take
care of their economic interests.

80 As all private international law rules, Guideline 27 on
collective rights management only relates to private
law issues. It does not identify the administrative
law that State authorities apply when controlling
collective rights management organizations (in the
following: CMOs). Whether national provisions are
of a private or administrative law nature should be
decided in the light of the potentially applicable
national law. Rules that have both a private and
administrative law character fall within the scope
of the Guidelines.

85 Regarding the relationship with users, application
of the lex loci protectionis rule according to Guideline
27(2) is mandated by the application of this same
law according to Guideline 25(1) in the case of
infringement. Hence, the lex loci protectionis applies
both to legal and to illegal use of rights. Application
of the lex loci protectionis also guarantees a levelplaying field of all, national and foreign, CMOs
with regard to the use of rights in a given State. In
contrast, deviation in favor of the law of the State
of the CMO’s actual seat of administration would
open the door for forum shopping, since CMOs could
choose to establish their seat in a State with lower
levels of protection for users.

81 Guideline 27 is an innovation in private international
law. Neither national law nor international law
specifically provide conflict rules relating to
collective rights management. When legislatures
adopt sector-specific rules on collective rights
management, they typically remain silent on issues
of private international law.

86 Yet some States limit the possibility of foreign CMOs
to claim rights for their right holders before national
courts. Guideline 27(3) characterizes this issue as a
procedural one, stating that the law of the forum
should decide on this matter. This rule prevents
individual States from introducing such limitations
on legal standing with effect before foreign courts.

82 Contrary to the past, private international law is
quickly gaining relevance with regard to collective
rights management. Especially in the field of online
use of music, multi-territorial licensing has emerged
as a new tool used by CMOs. Equally, right holders
may decide to mandate their rights to a foreign
CMO. In the European Union, harmonization of the
law on collective rights management is particularly
motivated by the objective to enhance cross-border
competition among national CMOs for right holders.

87 Guideline 27 needs to be delimited from of other
choice-of-law rules. Guideline 27(4) explicitly
states that Guideline 27 applies without prejudice
to the applicable competition law rules. Still, the
lex protectionis rule pursuant to Guideline 27(2) will
typically be the same as the law applicable under
the effects doctrine in the field of competition law.

83 The major question to be answered is whether and to
which extent a deviation from the lex loci protectionis
rule should be advocated. Guideline 27(1) proposes
such deviation in favor of the application of the
law of the State of the actual seat of administration
of a CMO for all issues regarding the relationship
between such CMO and right holders. Conversely,
Guideline 27(2) maintains the lex loci protectionis
rule for issues concerning the relationship between
a CMO and users.

88 Apart from Guideline 27(1)(c), Guideline 27 does
not aim to identify the contract law applicable to
the contractual relationship between a CMO, on the
one hand, and right holders or users, on the other
hand. Accordingly, the parties are in principle free
to choose the law that governs their contractual
relationships. Yet, where a choice of law is absent,
Guideline 27(1)(c) departs from Guideline 22,
stipulating that the law of the State of the CMO’s
actual seat of administration should apply in such
case. This rule recognizes the legitimate interest
of a CMO to apply its national law uniformly to
all, national and foreign, rights it manages and all,
national and foreign, right holders it represents.

84 Regarding the relationship with right holders,
application of the law of the State of the CMO’s actual
seat of administration has considerable advantages.
Right holders will often prefer to mandate their
rights under multiple national laws to a single
CMO. In such instances, Guidelines 27(1) avoids the
need for parallel application of multiple laws. This
enables the CMO to define its relationship with all
right holders uniformly against the backdrop of
its national law. Application of the national law at
the CMO’s actual seat of administration also favors
application of the same national law in a private
and administrative law context. Conversely, there
is no legitimate interest that would advocate the
application of the lex loci protectionis or the law of the
State of the habitual residence of the right holder.
1

89 The freedom to choose the applicable law also
governs the relationship with users pursuant to
Guidelines 21 and 22. Most importantly Guideline
22(1)(b) departs from the application of the lex loci
protectionis in case of contracts regarding intellectual
property for more than one State, such as in the case
of multi-territorial licenses. The second indent of this
provision, referring to the habitual residence of the
61
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party effectuating the characteristic performance,
will typically lead to the application of the law of
the State of the actual seat of the CMO that grants
the license.

an obligation to manage the rights of right holders.
Pursuant to Guideline 27(1)(b)(ii), B is obliged to
accept the management of A’s rights for all Member
States of the EU.

90 Guideline 27 does not include any rule on the
applicable law to representation agreements between
CMOs. In this regard, the applicable contract law also
arises from Guidelines 21 and 22. Yet Guideline 27(1)
also applies to the extent that a CMO has mandated
the management of rights it represents to another
CMO, especially with regard to the territory of
another State. Hence, Guideline 27(1) should not
be read to apply exclusively to cases where right
holders directly claim rights against a CMO but also
where they do so through representation by their
CMO against another CMO.

Hypothetical 3
The law of State X provides for an unwaivable
remuneration right of authors and performers
regarding the rental of a phonogram or a film
where the exclusive right has been licensed to a
phonogram or a film producer. The remuneration
right can only be claimed by a CMO. In addition,
the law of X recognizes the principal director of a
cinematographic or audiovisual work at least as a coauthor of such work. A is a film director who was hired
by the film producer B from State Y for producing a
film which is also exploited in State X through the
rental of DVDs. Under the contract with B, A has
transferred or licensed all worldwide copyrights to
the extent possible to B. Pursuant to Guideline 19, the
non-transferability of the remuneration right under
the law of X as the applicable lex loci protectionis
is recognized from a private international law
perspective. Because of the lack of transferability,
initial ownership of the remuneration right is also
governed by the law of X pursuant to Guideline 20(2)
(b). Therefore, A has to be considered the holder of
the unwaivable remuneration right under the law of
X. In addition, pursuant to the law of X, applicable as
the lex loci protectionis pursuant to Guideline 27(2)
(b), A has to use the system of mandatory collective
rights management in X to generate income from
the remuneration right.

91 Guideline 27(1)(a) identifies the applicable law for
requirements for the specific corporate structure
of CMOs. Yet this rule does not define the applicable
corporate law to CMOs. However, in individual cases,
it may restrict the autonomy, otherwise available
to the founders and members of a CMO under the
applicable corporate law, to choose a particular
corporate form or to design the internal rules or
structure of a CMO.
Extended comments
Hypothetical 1
A is a limited society established in State X and
manages the related rights of broadcasting
organizations. A decides to open an office in State
Y for the sole purpose of directly granting licenses
for the cable retransmissions of its programs to the
local cable operators. A is also directly mandated to
manage the rights of the programs of the private
TV broadcasting corporation B from State Z
under the copyright law of X and Y. Regarding the
relationship between B and A, Guideline 27(1) leads
to the application of the law of X with regard to the
rights under the law of Y. As regards the connecting
factor of the “actual seat of administration”, it is only
relevant where the CMO administers the relationship
with the right holders; the mere fact that A decided
to locate the licensing of rights to an office in State Y
as regards to cable operators in Y does not suffice to
the make the law of Y applicable to the relationship
between M and A.

Scope of application and connecting factors
92 Guideline 27 only applies to ‘collective rights
management organizations’ (CMOs) without
providing a definition of such organizations. To
distinguish CMOs from other entities that acquire
rights from original right holders, the distinguishing
criterion is the fiduciary relationship between the
CMO and its right holders. Within these entities,
national jurisdictions may further differentiate. For
instance, EU law distinguishes between “collective
management organizations”, on the one hand, and
“independent management organizations”, on the
other. The former are owned or controlled by the
right holders or organized on a non-for-profit basis.35
Such differentiation is needed on the EU level, since
different rules of EU law will only apply to the former
group of entities or to both. For the purpose of
applying Guideline 27, the concept of a “collective
rights management organization” should be
understood broadly to cover all cases where national
laws provide for special rules applicable to entities
that manage copyrights or related rights on behalf of

Hypothetical 2
Composer A is habitually resident in the South
American State X. Her music is especially popular
in the EU. She therefore seeks to mandate the CMO B,
which has its headquarters in the EU Member State
Y, with the licensing of her rights for the whole of
the EU. Under the national law of Y, a CMO is under
1

35
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95 However, this definition is still in need of being
adjusted to the purposes of Guideline 27(1). Since
Guideline 27(1) only applies to the relationship of
CMOs with right holders, the relevant economic
activity in the sense of the abovementioned
definition from the Services Directive should be
limited to the administration of relationships with
right holders. Hence, in the case where a CMO only
opens an office in another State for the purpose of
granting licenses to users in that State, while the
relationships with right holders are administered
from the headquarters, the CMO should not be
considered to have an actual seat of administration
in that State of the licensing branch for the purpose
of applying Guideline 27(1) (see Hypothetical 1,
above). Conversely, where a CMO decides to locate
the administration of the relationship with right
holders or a group of right holders to a branch in
another State, the law of that State will apply. Hence
the “actual seat of administration” does not have to
be the principle seat of the CMO’s overall economic
operation.

more than one right holder. Accordingly, Guideline
27 should in principle also apply to “independent
management organizations” in the sense of EU law.
93 As expressed by its title, Guideline 27 only applies
to CMOs that manage copyrights and related
rights. There are also entities that manage other
intellectual property rights, especially patents, on
behalf of several right holders. However, extension
of Guideline 27 to so-called “patent aggregators”
or “patent assertion entities (PAEs)” is not needed,
since national laws do not typically provide for
special sector-specific private rights regarding the
relationship of such entities with right holders or
potential users. To the extent that national law
controls so-called patent “hold-up”, as the claiming
of an injunction against an implementer especially
of standard essential patents with the objective
to charge excessive royalty rates, the underlying
patent, contract or competition law rules typically
apply to all patent holders and not specifically to
PAEs acting on behalf of other right holders. Yet
courts will not be prevented from applying Guideline
27 mutatis mutandis where national laws provide
or will provide for rules that specifically apply to
entities managing other rights than copyrights and
related rights.

Requirements for the specific corporate structure of
CMOs
96 The corporate structure of CMOs has an impact
on the ability of right holders to become members
or shareholders of the CMO and, hence, to control
the operation of the CMO. To protect the economic
interests of right holders, some national laws
therefore prescribe a particular corporate form39
for the operation of collective rights management
or create obligations for the design of the corporate
structure of CMOs. Some national laws may also
require CMOs to be run as non-for-profit entities.40

94 For the purpose of applying Guideline 27(1),
the Guidelines do not define the “actual seat
of administration of a CMO”. This provides the
necessary flexibility to ensure that the same national
law applies in both private and administrative law
enforcement. In the EU context, the connecting
factor should in principle be understood in the
sense of the “State of the establishment” of a CMO.
According to Article 36(1) EU CMO Directive36, EU
Member States are under an obligation to ensure
that their competent authorities control compliance
of CMOs established in their territory with the
national law adopted under the Directive.37 Since
the CMO Directive, not containing a definition of
“establishment” either, aims to guarantee the
freedom of providing services of CMOs within the
internal market, it seems appropriate in principle to
define “establishment” according to the rules of the
EU Services Directive, namely, as “the actual pursuit
of an economic activity … by the provider for an
indefinite period and through a stable infrastructure
from where the business of providing services is
actually carried out”.38
36

EU CMO Directive 2014/26/EU, [2014] OJ L84/21.

37

According to Article 2(4) CMO Directive 2014/26/EU,
[2014] OJ L84/21, Article 36 also applies to “independent
management organizations” in the sense of Article 3(b) of
the Directive.

38

1

97 Guideline 27(1)(a) only relates to rules that
specifically regulate the corporate structure of
CMOs. It does not replace the generally applicable
choice-of-law rule for corporate law matters. The
two conflict rules can in fact lead to different
national laws where the choice-of-law rule of the
deciding court on corporate law matters designates
the law of the State of the incorporation as the
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on
services in the internal market, [2006] L376/36.

Article 4(5) Directive 2006/123/EC of the European

63

39

For instance, Turkish law requires CMOs to be incorporated
as “professional unions in accordance with the regulations
and type statutes prepared by the Ministry of Culture and
approved by the Board of Ministers”; Section 42 Law No.
5846 of 5 December 1951 on Intellectual and Artistic Works,
as amended by Law No. 4110 of 7 June 7 1995.

40

For an overview of such systems see Copyright, Competition
and Development, Report by the Max-Planck-Institute for
Intellectual Property and Competition Law on behalf of
WIPO (author Josef Drexl, December 2013), 232.
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applicable law and the incorporation took place in
another State than the State of the CMO’s actual
seat of administration. Hence, in such instances,
the corporate law of the State of incorporation still
applies in principle; but the law of the State of the
CMO’s actual seat of administration can limit the
freedom of the founders to choose among different
legal forms under the applicable corporate law
and, especially, to design the concrete corporate
structure of the CMO. Still, problems can arise where
the applicable law under Guideline 27(1)(a) requires
a particular corporate structure that is only available
under the law of the State of the CMO’s actual seat
of administration. Such rule may indeed result in a
requirement for a CMO to re-incorporate itself under
the law of its actual seat of administration.

rights and conditions of entrusting rights to a CMO,
on the one hand42, and for withdrawing such rights,
on the other hand.43
100 Inter alia, Guideline 27(1)(b)(ii) applies to the statutory
duty of a CMO to accept the collective management
of a given right holder (see Hypothetical 2, above)
and, more generally, to the principles that apply
for accepting the management of rights of a given
right holder. The latter may include thresholds of
revenue generated from the management of rights,
general principles such as non-discrimination and
the important issue of whether CMOs can claim
exclusive authorization from the right holders.44
Some national laws may also limit the application of
certain rules, including the limitation of the statutory
duty of a CMO to accept the collective management
to nationals.45 Regarding their characterization, such
rules can neither be regarded mandatory contract
rules governed by Guidelines 21 and 22, nor does
the lex loci proctectionis govern such rules according
to Guideline 25 on infringement. In addition, such
rules cannot be considered rules on transferability

Rights, conditions and principles concerning the
relationship of the right holder with a CMO
98 Guideline 27(1)(b) provides for a choice-of-law
rule that makes the law of the State of the actual
seat of the CMO applicable to all rights, conditions
and principles concerning the relationship of the
right holder with the CMO. To the extent that these
rules include rights that define the contractual
relationship of right holders with the CMO in the
sense of mandatory contract law or rules that can be
taken into account in the framework of rules against
unfair contract terms, Guideline 27(1)(b) has to be
considered a deviation from the freedom-of-choice
rule of Guideline 21.
99 Regarding the rights and conditions for becoming
a member of a CMO, Guideline 27(1)(b)(i) is situated
at the borderline with Guideline 27(1)(a), since such
rights and conditions, read in a broader sense, also
affect the corporate structure of the CMO in the
sense of the latter Guideline. Since both Guidelines
lead to the application of the same law of the
State of the CMO’s actual seat of administration, a
clear delimitation of the two rules is not needed.
The scope of application of Guideline 27(1)(b)
(i) is characterized by the fact that these rules
specifically relate to access of rights holders to
membership.41 Yet this provision does not require
that the concrete rule provides for a “right” of the
right holder to become a member. It suffices that
membership requirements can be addressed in a
private law dispute. Equally, the person relying on
such rules before a private law court does not have
to be the right holder him/herself. It suffices that
the law allows reliance on such rules, for instance,
by a private person challenging the legality of the
statutes of the CMO. Guidelines 27(1)(b)(ii) and (iii)
address two sides of the same coin by referring to the
41

1

An example of such rights and conditions can be found in
Article 6(2) European CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014]
OJ L84/21.
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42

As an example, see Article 5(2), 1st sentence, EU CMO
Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014] OJ L84/21, providing,
among others, for a “right” of right holders “to authorize
a collective management organization of their choice
to manage the rights, categories of rights or types of
works and other subject-matter of their choice, for the
territories of their choice, irrespective of the Member State
of nationality, residence or establishment of either the
collective management organization or the right holder”.
See also Article 5(2), 2nd sentence, EU CMO Directive
(2014/26/EU), [2014] OJ L84/21, providing that a CMO can
only refuse the management of rights under ‘objectively
justified reasons’.

43

As an example, see Article 5(4) EU CMO Directive (2014/26/
EU), [2014] OJ L84/21, providing for a “right” of right
holders “to terminate the authorization to manage rights,
categories of rights or types of works and other subjectmatter granted to them to a collective management
organization or to withdraw from a collective management
organization and of the rights, categories of rights or
types of works and other subject-matter of their choice, as
determined pursuant to paragraph 2, for the territory of
their choice, upon serving reasonable notice not exceeding
six months”.

44

Whether CMOs can claim exclusivity is also a matter of
competition law.

45

In this regard, Article 5(2) EU Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014]
OJ L84/21, referring to the “Member State of nationality,
residence or establishment” can easily create the impression
that the provision allows for discrimination against non-EU
nationals. However, such a discrimination would have to be
considered a violation of the national treatment obligation
of international copyright law.
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in the sense of Guideline 19. Thus, Guideline 27(1)(b)
is indeed filling a gap left by the other Guidelines.

holding any rights.52 Regarding this latter issue,
a problem of delimitation appears in relation to
Guideline 19 regarding transferability. Whether a
CMO, based on a decision of its governing bodies,
can stipulate that part of the income will generally
be paid to the representatives of a certain group
of persons, such as the publishers in particular,
without evidence that they are actual right holders,
will be governed by the law of the State of the
CMO’s principal seat of administration according to
Guideline 27(1)(b)(iv). Yet the preliminary question
of whether the specific rights, such as the right to
fair compensation, can actually been transferred53
has to be decided according to the law of the State for
which protection is sought according to Guideline 19
(see Hypothetical 3, above).

101 Guideline 27(1)(b)(iii) governs the rights and rules on
the contractual freedom of right holders to withdraw
rights or, more broadly, to terminate the contractual
relationship with a given CMO. It is to be noted
that competition law has produced considerable
practice on these issues.46 Such practice, however,
can only directly be considered within the scope
of the applicable competition law, as clarified by
Guideline 27(4).
102 Guideline 27(1)(b)(iv) completes the contract-law
related aspects by making the law of the State of
the actual seat of administration also applicable
to the requirements regarding the calculation and
the distribution of the revenue.47 Inter alia, such
rules can stipulate by when the income must be
distributed to right holders,48 how the CMOs have
to deal with income that cannot be distributed
to the individual right holders49, whether right
holders are protected against loss of their right to
be remunerated after termination of their contract
with a CMO or withdrawal of their rights,50 whether
CMOs are allowed to make certain deductions from
the income such as for social or cultural purposes51,
or whether and under which conditions part of the
income can be transferred to persons that are not

46

104 Guideline 27(1)(b) only provides for a non-exhaustive
list of issues regarding the relationship of CMOs with
their right holders to which the law of the State of
the CMO’s actual seat of administration applies. Still,
it appears as rather unlikely that issues regarding
the relationship with right holders will be at stake
in private law proceedings that are not listed in
Guideline 27(1)(b).

Already in 1974, the CJEU established the need to protect
right holders against the market power of a CMO by ensuring
“a balance between the requirements of maximum freedom
for authors, composers, and publishers to dispose of their
works and that of effective management of their rights”. See
CJEU, 127/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25 - BRT v SABAM, paragraph 8.
This led to a test according to which a CMO can only impose
those restrictions on the freedom to right holders, including
the right to withdraw one’s rights, that are “absolutely
necessary” for the enjoyment of a position required for
the CMO to carry out its activity. Ibid., paragraphs 11 and
12 (criticizing in particular the assignment of rights over
an extended period after the member’s withdrawal from a
CMO).

47

As an example, see Article 11-13 EU CMO Directive (2014/26/
EU), [2014] OJ L84/21.

48

See Article 13(1)(2) EU CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014]
OJ L84/21.

49

See Article 13(2) through (6) EU CMO Directive (2014/26/
EU), [2014] OJ L84/21.

50

Such protection is to be granted pursuant to Article 5(5) EU
CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014] OJ L84/21.

51

See Article 12 EU CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014] OJ L84/21.

1

103 Finally, Guideline 27(1)(b)(v) relates to rules that
require CMO to offer mechanisms of alternative
dispute resolution to right holders.54 Where such
mechanisms are in place, the respective dispute
settlement bodies can make use of Guideline 27(1)
(b)(v) especially to the extent that the national law
provides for more detailed rules on the scope of
the disputes covered and the applicable procedural
rules.

The relationship between CMOs and users
105 Guideline 27(2) contains an exhaustive list of issues
regarding the activity of CMOs with regard to the

65

52

See, in particular, the CJEU copyright decisions in CJEU,
C-277/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:65 - Luksan; CJEU, C-572/13,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:750 - Hewlett-Packard v Reprobel. See also the
German Federal Supreme Court, I ZR 198/13 = BGHZ 210, 77,
21 April 2016– Verlegerbeteiligung (no participation of publishers in the income generated from statutory remuneration rights, including the private copyright levy).

53

This was answered in the negative by the CJEU for the right
to fair compensation under EU copyright law by the CJEU.
See CJEU, C-277/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:65 – Luksan, paragraphs
93 and 100 (holding that the right holder cannot waive the
right to fair remuneration in the framework of the private
copying exemption).

54

See, in particular, Article 34(1) EU CMO Directive (2014/26/
EU), [2014] OJ L84/21, which also applies to conflicts between users and the CMO as well as among CMOs.
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use of works and rights to which the law of the State
for which protection is sought (lex loci protectionis)
applies.

power of a representative of the copyright industry
to which the rights may otherwise be transferred
or licensed without adequate remuneration. This
is, for instance, the objective of the introduction of
the unwaivable remuneration right of authors and
performers regarding the rental of a phonogram or
a film, where the exclusive right has been licensed
to a phonogram or a film producer, for which
EU law provides for mandatory collective rights
management (see Hypothetical 3, above).

106 This choice of law is particularly convincing in
the context of Guideline 27(2)(a) relating to the
presumption that a CMO is empowered to seek
protection for certain works or subject-matter of
related rights. A CMO will in particular need to rely
on such a presumption when it aims to enforce
rights of a multitude of right holders against alleged
infringers in cases of mass uses of rights. According
to Guideline 27(2)(a) and Guideline 25, the same
law applies to infringement and the question of
whether a CMO can be presumed to be mandated
with the enforcement of rights. The choice-of-law
rule in Guideline 27(2)(a) is not questioned by the
departure from the lex loci protectionis for initial
ownership in copyright cases pursuant to Guideline
20(2)(a) regarding initial ownership, since CMOs
are not initial owners. For the question of whether
they are effectively mandated to claim rights, it is
more relevant whether the rights are transferable.
According to Guideline 19, transferability is also
governed by the lex loci protectionis.

108 The same policy arguments explain why Guideline
27(2)(c) also makes the lex loci protectionis applicable
to rules that empower CMOs to grant licenses or
collect statutory remuneration without prior consent
of the right holder (so-called “extended collective
licensing or management”).56 Such extended
collective licensing systems can be particularly
helpful to enable the digitization of orphan57 and
out-of-commerce works.58
109 Application of the lex loci protectionis is particularly
appropriate where rules on collective rights
management specifically protect the interest of
rights of the users against the bargaining power of
CMOs. Such rules can be grouped into two categories
that are addressed by Guideline 27(2)(d) and (e)
respectively.

107 National laws can promote access to the use of
works and the subject-matter of related rights
by exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights.
Still, they may take account of the interest of
right holders to fair compensation by providing
for statutory remuneration rights. To manage the
collection of such remuneration from the users
and distribution of the income to the right holders,
legislatures often make use of mandatory collective
rights management. Equally, legislatures sometimes
also provide for such management for the grant of
licenses for the use of exclusive rights.55 In both cases
mandatory collective rights management strikes a
balance between the interests of users in freely using
certain works or subject-matter of protection or in
getting licenses from a central licensing unit, on
the one hand, with the interest of right holders in
fair compensation, on the other hand. Application
of the lex loci protectionis to mandatory collective
rights management according to Guideline 27(2)(b)
guarantees uniformity of access and remuneration
in a given territory irrespective of the nationality or
residence of right holders or the seat of the CMO. The
same territoriality approach is also justified where
the legislature chooses mandatory collective rights
management as a means to protect the interest of
original right holders against the superior bargaining
55

1

110 The first group of rules, addressed in Guideline
27(2)(d), relate to the conditions under which users
can claim the licensing of rights. Such rules can
for instance state general principles of licensing,
including good-faith negotiation as well as principles

For EU law, this is the case for the cable retransmission right
according to Article 9(1) Council Directive of 27 September
1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, [1993] OJ
L248/15.
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56

Such systems are particularly known from the copyright
laws in the Nordic States. See also Article 9(2) EU Satellite
and Cable Directive, [1993] OJ L248/15, according to which a
CMO that manages cable retransmission rights for the same
category will be deemed to be mandated to manage also the
rights of right holders who have not given a prior mandate
for such management to this CMO.

57

National jurisdictions in the EU, especially the Nordic States,
have introduced extended collective licensing schemes for
promoting the digitization of orphan works. The EU Orphan
Works Directive does not mandate the introduction of
such systems, but safeguards existing national extended
collective licensing schemes. See Recital 24 and Article 1(5)
Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 25 October 2012 on certain permitted uses of
orphan works, [2012] OJ L299/5.

58

On the level of EU law, Article 8(1) Directive (EU) 2019/790
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single
Market, [2019] OJ L130/92, and amending Directives 96/9/
EC, [1996] OJ L77/20, and 2001/29/EC, [2001] L167/10, now
provides for the grant of extended collective licenses for
out-of-commerce works to cultural heritage institutions.
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112 Moreover, it has to be noted that, within the EU,
application of the lex loci protectionis of Guideline
27(2)(d) and (e) can lead to the application of
different national laws in private law disputes, on
the one hand, and administrative proceedings, on
the other. Under Guideline 27(2)(d) and (e), the
claimant will rely on the law of the Member State
for which the license is sought or for which the CMO
seeks statutory remuneration, while the law of the
Member State where the CMO is established applies
according to Article 36(1) EU CMO Directive to the
extent that national authorities enforce the national
rules adopted for the implementation of Article 16
EU CMO Directive on the licensing rates and the
setting of tariffs by CMOs in relation to users. The
reason for the latter is that the Directive generally
seeks to liberalize free provision of collective rights
management services in the EU internal market. It
therefore fully concentrates administrative control
in the hands of the authority of the Member State
where the CMO is established and, moreover,
provides that such control will only be exercised
based on the national rules of that State. Yet such
internal market considerations cannot justify a
deviation of the application of the lex loci protectionis
for rules that are designed to be applied globally.
Yet Guideline 27(2)(d) and (e) also provides for the
appropriate choice-of-law rules between EU Member
States. These rules guarantee that, where a dispute
relates to the licensing of rights or the collection
of statutory remuneration rights under the law of
an EU Member State, the law of this State will also
govern the substantive law principles concerning
the control of the CMO in this context. In addition,
since the Directive is not intended to change private
international law rules63, Guideline 27(2)(d) and (e) is
not in conflict with Article 36(1) EU CMO Directive.

of objectivity and non-discrimination.59 Some
States provide for an express duty to license.60 This
Guideline also relates to requirements concerning
the terms of licensing contracts.
111 Rules regarding the requirements on the calculation
of the royalty rates and statutory remuneration,
as addressed by Guideline 27(2)(e), are most
important in practice. Disputes typically arise on
the appropriateness of the royalty rates of CMOs.
Guideline 27(2)(e) only relates to the substantive
standards of control of the royalty rates such as the
EU rule on appropriateness and reasonableness in
relation to the economic value of the use of the rights
in trade61, but not to procedural issues. Procedures,
however, matter enormously from a private law
perspective against the backdrop of a large diversity
of specialized dispute settlement bodies that can be
found in different jurisdictions. This explains why,
to guarantee a functioning system of private law
control, it is important that the rules on jurisdiction
enable the dispute settlement bodies of the loci
protectionis to decide on such matters. To achieve
this, Guideline 6 provides for optional jurisdiction
of the courts of the States where the use takes
place.62 This allows the user or the CMO initiating
proceedings on the reasonableness of royalty rates
to seize the most appropriate dispute settlement
body, which will then apply its own substantive
law as a benchmark for the appropriateness of the
royalty rates pursuant to Guideline 27(2)(e).

59

See especially Article 16 EU CMO Directive (2014/26/EU),
[2014] OJ L84/21.

60

Such a duty to license has traditionally been part of the German rights management law. This duty is maintained under
the law implementing the EU CMO Directive. See Section
34 German Act on Collective Rights Management Organizations of 24 May 2016. Other jurisdictions may recognize a
duty to license as a matter of competition law. This is the
case also in the US under paragraph VI of the ASCAP Consent Decree: Second Amended Final Judgment entered in
United States v. ASCAP (S.D. N.Y. 2001).

61

See Article 16(2)(2) EU CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014]
OJ L84/21.

62

Guideline 5 takes inspiration from the CJEU judgment in
Austro-Mechana, which characterized the action of a CMO
for payment of the private copying levy as a delictual or
quasi-delictual conflict covered by Article 5(3) Brussels I
Regulation No. 44/2001, [2001] OJ L12/1 (now Article 7(2)
Brussels Ia Regulation No. 1215/2012, [2012] OJ L351/1).
See CJEU, C-572/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:286 - Austro-Mechana v
Amazon EU. Against the backdrop of this judgment, Guideline
6 can be understood as a clarification of Guideline 5.

1

The law applicable to multi-territorial licensing
113 Guideline 27 is not providing for any specific choiceof-law rules concerning multi-territorial licensing
especially of online rights by CMOs despite the fact
that EU Member States have by now implemented
substantive rules on such multi-territorial licensing
of online rights for works in music based on Title
III of the EU CMO Directive.64 The Guidelines are
drafted on the assumption that the general rules
of Guideline 27 and Guidelines 21 and 22 suffice
to provide for adequate choice-of-law rules for
issues concerning multi-territorial licensing.

67

63

Recital 56 EU CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014] OJ L84/21.

64

Articles 23-32 EU CMO Directive (2014/26/EU), [2014] OJ
L84/21.
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114 In particular, Guideline 27(1) constitutes the
adequate private international law framework for
cases in which one CMO, thereby acting on behalf
of its right holders, seeks to mandate another CMO
with the multi-territorial licensing of its repertoire.
In this context, Article 30 EU CMO Directive is most
important. Article 30(1) obliges Member States to
ensure that CMOs that grant multi-territorial licenses
are “required to agree” to a request by another
CMO to enter into a representation agreement for
the multi-territorial licensing of the repertoire
of the requesting CMO. The most appropriate
implementation of this provision consists in a
private law duty to contract.65 Hence, pursuant to
Guideline 27(1)(b)(ii), the applicable law to the right
of a CMO to request another CMO to enter into an
agreement of multi-territorial licensing is the law of
the State of the actual seat of administration of the
requested CMO.

Short comments
116 The concept of public policy is well established in
almost all jurisdictions. Ever since the 1956 Hague
Convention on the law applicable to maintenance
obligations towards children, similar – if not quasiidentical – wording has been employed in numerous
international choice of law instruments when
drafting the public policy exception. The rationale
underlying this exception and the effects of its
application are equivalent to the implications of
overriding mandatory provisions of the forum. In
both cases, the law determined under the choice
of law rules provided by the Guidelines can be
disregarded. Nevertheless, both mechanisms remain
different. Whereas overriding mandatory provisions
preempt the choice of law rules, the public policy
exception functions as a final safeguard that allows
a court to refuse the application of a provision of the
law of any State specified by the choice of law rules
provided for by the Guidelines. The law designated
should only be disregarded in cases of clear
incompatibility with the public policy of the forum.
In line with the usual drafting of this safeguard in
international instruments, under the Guidelines,
the exclusion is applied only if the incompatibility
is “manifest”.

115 More complex issues concerning multi-territorial
licensing seem to arise in the context of Guideline
27(2)(d) and (e). These rules will lead to parallel
application of several national laws as far as the
relationships between the CMO and users are
concerned. The same phenomenon will appear
with regard to jurisdiction, since Guideline 6 would
especially allow users to initiate parallel proceedings
in different fora. Yet these consequences are not
per se inappropriate, even where a CMO grants a
uniform royalty rate for the entirety of the territory
of the States covered. In such instances, users could
question the appropriateness of the royalty rates
before any of the competent Courts pursuant to
Guideline 6 and any of the respective laws applicable
under Guideline 27(2)(d) and (e).

117 Guideline 28 requires to identify, on the one hand,
the forum’s public policy and, on the other hand,
the manifest incompatibility between the designated
law and the public policy applied. Each step must
be followed. The identification of the public policy
can be difficult because it is not a pure intellectual
property question but a broader question of the
social, cultural and economic policies of the forum
State. It is subject to gradual change as long as the
values of the society also change in the course of
time. The mere incompatibility is not enough to
exclude, according to the guidelines, the designated
rule. Then, the manifest incompatibility needs a
specific autonomous appreciation.

Josef Drexl

D. Other Provisions
28. Public Policy

Extended comments

The application of the law determined under
these Guidelines may be refused only to the extent
that its effects would be manifestly contrary to
the public policy of the forum.

Hypothetical
An infringement is committed in X. The infringer
is from Y. The plaintiff decides to bring an
infringement claim before the courts of State Y.
Under Guideline 25, the law of X is applicable,
protection being sought for X. Under X’s law,
punitive damages can be ordered. If punitive
damages are considered as being manifestly contrary
to Y’s public policy, the provisions of X providing for
punitive damages are not applied on that specific
question. Y’s law is applicable only in order to
determine that punitive damages are not allowed.

See as reference provisions
§ 322 ALI Principles
Art 3:902 CLIP Principles
Art 313 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

65

1

See, for instance, Section 69(1) German Act on Collective
Rights Management Organizations of 24 May 2016.

68
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For the rest, X’s law remains applicable, since its
effects would not be manifestly contrary to the
public policy of Y’s law.66

application. In consequence, the interpretation of the
criterion of manifest incompatibility remains subject
to case-by-case analysis. Only serious breaches of
essential values and fundamental principles of the
law of the forum would justify intervention by way
of this exceptional clause.

118 Since the choice of law rules are abstract and may
potentially lead to the application of the law of any
State in the world, it is possible that provisions of the
law designated are in contradiction with basic values
and fundamental principles of the forum State. The
public policy exception allows a court to refuse the
application of provisions of the designated foreign
law. The public policy exception concerns basic
values and fundamental principles of the law of the
forum State, such as those regarding the protection
of intellectual property rights and their balancing
with freedom of expression and other fundamental
rights. The concept is the same as the one used
as a limit to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in Guideline 34 (1). It should be
observed that the way in which a balance is achieved
between the protection of intellectual property and
the safeguard of the fundamental rights that may
be involved in these situations varies among States.
Such a balance is subject to political, economic and
social change. This, in turn, may affect the way in
which the judge applies those factors to the specific
facts of the case.67

120 Once the incompatibility has been identified, the
effect of the public policy’s exception is dual. The
relevant provisions of the law designated are not
applied. This is the negative effect of the exception
leading to the exclusion of the law designated.
Secondly, a decision is to be adopted as to the
substance of the matter. The Guidelines do not solve
this issue and hence the private international law of
the forum should be determinative. In many States
the law of the forum shall be applied to decide on the
substance of the matter instead of the law designated.
In other States more flexible approaches are possible,
including replacing the otherwise applicable law
with the law of other closely connected that is not
contrary to the public policy of the forum. This is the
positive effect of the exception. Nevertheless, such
a substitution is limited to the part of the applicable
law being manifestly contrary to the public policy of
the forum. For the rest, the originally designated law
remains applicable.

119 Once public policy is identified, the application of
the foreign law to the case can be refused only if it is
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the forum.
First, the exception is limited to the public policy of
the forum State. Second, this safeguard requires more
than a mere incompatibility with the public policy
of the forum. This second precondition requires
the court to find special grounds for upholding an
objection to the application of foreign law. The term
“manifestly” is intended to make it clear that this
device is an exception that is subject to restrictive
interpretation. In practice, however, the provision
does not provide any additional guidance as to its

Edouard Treppoz, Nicolas Binctin
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See as reference provisions
§ 323 ALI Principles
Art 3:901 CLIP Principles
Art 312 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

67

1

29. Overriding Mandatory Provisions
1. Nothing in these Guidelines shall restrict
the application of the overriding mandatory
provisions of the law of the forum.
2. When applying under these Guidelines the
law of a State to a contract, the court may
give effect to the law of another State where
the obligations arising out of the contract
have to be or have been performed.

See French Court of Cassation, n° 09-13303, (2010)
considering that punitive damages as such are not contrary
to French Public Order, except if they are disproportionate.
See also, Paris Court of Appeal, Feb. 1st 1989, RIDA oct.
1989, paragraph 301. See also: Card Reader Case, Japanese
Supreme Court Decision (Heisei 14.9.26) Minshu vol. 56 no.
7, paragraph 1551 ff, in that case the Japanese Supreme
Court considered that the application of the U.S. Patent Act
is contrary to “public order” as described in Article 33 of
Horei.

Short comments
121 Overriding mandatory provisions limit choice of
law rules, by preempting the law determined under
these Guidelines. Overriding mandatory provisions
are directly applicable to situations falling within
their scope, irrespective of the law designated by
the otherwise applicable choice of law rule. The
effect of overriding mandatory provisions of the
forum is equivalent to the public policy exception.
Indeed, both mechanisms exclude the application
of provisions of the foreign law determined by
the choice of law rule. Nevertheless, overriding

The draft of the Guideline is in line with the text of the
public policy exception in international conventions on
choice of law, such as the conventions adopted by the Hague
Conference of Private International law. Such a wording
has also become common to many national and regional
codifications of choice of law rule, as illustrated in the EU
by Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation.
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125 Identification of overriding mandatory provisions
is usually a complex and challenging question, to
the extent that legislation does not expressly made
clear that it applies to cross-border situations
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable. Indeed,
the legislature rarely indicates the overriding
mandatory nature of the provisions. One remarkable
exception is Section 32 b of the German Act on
Copyright and Related Right, which states that
equitable remuneration is compulsory if German
law would be applicable to the contract of use in
the absence of a choice of law or to the extent that
the agreement covers significant acts of use within
the territory to which the Act applies.

mandatory provisions are directly applicable. They
preempt the choice of law rule, which is not applied.
122 The effect of overriding mandatory provisions varies
depending on their origin. When they belong to the
law of the forum, judges are under a duty to apply
them to all situations falling within their scope.
They prevail over the otherwise applicable law.
Additionally, in situations concerning contracts, the
possibility to give effect to overriding mandatory
provisions of third States is also envisaged with
limitations. In certain situations, Courts may
give effect to such rules after having taken into
account the connection between the dispute and
the overriding mandatory provisions and all other
relevant factors, such as the nature and purpose
of those provisions. The latter possibility is only
envisaged with regard to contracts. Only overriding
mandatory provisions belonging to the law of the
State, where the obligations arising out of the
contract have to be or have been performed, may
preempt the lex contractus.

126 Under Guideline 29(1) overriding mandatory rules
of the law of the forum prevail always within their
scope of application. Once the identification is made,
the spatial scope of these overriding mandatory
rules has to be determined. In the French Huston
case mentioned above, the overriding mandatory
rule was applicable for protection sought in France.
If the lex loci protectionis would have been applicable,
overriding mandatory rules would have been useless
in that case.

Extended comments
123 The concept of overriding mandatory provisions is
much more restrictive than the broader concept of
“mandatory rules”, which is relevant with regard
to domestic situations. Overriding mandatory rules
constitute an exception and hence are subject to
restrictive interpretation. In this context, they have
to be distinguished from local mandatory provisions.
Only a small part of local mandatory provisions
may be characterized as overriding mandatory
provisions, preempting the choice of law rules. As
an example of such a restrictive understanding of
the concept, it can be mentioned that under EU law,
overriding mandatory rules are defined as being
“provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by
a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its
political, social or economic organization, to such an extent
that they are applicable to any situation falling within
their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable “
(Rome I Regulation Article 9 1).

127 Under Guideline 29(2) a court may also give effect
to overriding mandatory provisions of the law of a
third State in situations involving an international
contract. The term “give effect” may be found in
this context in Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation.
Also in Guideline 29 the term “to apply” must be
distinguished from the concept “to give effect”. As
explained in the Lagarde-Guiliano Report69, “the
words “effect may be given” impose on the court the
extremely delicate task of combining the mandatory
provisions with the law normally applicable to the
contract in the particular situation in question”.
128 Only overriding mandatory provisions belonging
to the law of another State where the obligations
arising out of the contract have to be or have been
performed may preempt the lex contractus. This
limitation is in line with article 9 (3) of Rome I
Regulation. According to this provision “effect may
be given to the overriding mandatory provisions
of the law of the country where the obligations
arising out of the contract have to be or have been
performed”. However, it is important to note that
when interpreting this provision the CJEU has
established that it “does not preclude overriding
mandatory provisions of a State other than the
State of the forum or the State where the obligations
arising out of the contract have to be or have been

124 For instance, under French law, certain moral
rights have been considered as being an overriding
mandatory rule.68 As a consequence, it prevails
over the otherwise applicable law. In that specific
case, US law was applicable in accordance with the
relevant French choice of law rule. Nevertheless,
the French Court applied provisions of French law
that were regarded as overriding mandatory rules
and on that basis such provisions prevailed over
US law designated by the French choice of law rule.

68
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French Court of Cassation, n° 89-1952 89-19725 (1991) Huston case.

69
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Report on the Convention of the law applicable to
contractual obligations, Eur Lex 319080Y1031(01).
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performed from being taken into account as a
matter of fact, in so far as this is provided for by a
substantive rule of the law that is applicable to the
contract pursuant to the Regulation”.70

on contractual and non-contractual obligation.
For instance, the choice of law rules of the Hague
Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable
to Products Liability establish that the applicable law
shall be the “internal law” of the designated State
(see, e.g., articles 4, 5 and 6). Additionally, pursuant to
Article 24 of the Rome II Regulation “The application
of the law of any country specified by this Regulation
means the application of the rules of law in force in
that State other than its rules of private international
law”. A similar rule may be found in Article 20 of the
Rome I Regulation. Renvoi is also excluded under
article 8 of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in
International Commercial Contracts. The exclusion
of renvoi is deemed to foster legal certainty and
predictability.

Edouard Treppoz, Nicolas Binctin
30. Renvoi
The application of the law of any State determined
under these Guidelines means the application of
the rules of law in force in that State other than
its rules of private international law.
See as reference provisions
§ 324 ALI Principles
Art 3:903 CLIP Principles
Art 310 Joint Korean-Japanese Principles

Edouard Treppoz, Nicolas Binctin
31. Arbitrability

Short comments

When assessing the arbitrability of disputes
concerning intellectual property rights,
courts and arbitral tribunals shall take into
consideration the law of the arbitration, to the
extent that the rights in dispute have a close
connection with it, and that of the State of
protection, particularly insofar as the award has
to be recognized and enforced in that State.

129 Guideline 30 solves the question of the nature and
scope of the referral by the choice of law rule. In
particular, it addresses the issue whether the
referral covers only substantial rules or also private
international rules. The renvoi doctrine is based on
the assumption that the application of the law of the
State designated by the choice of law rules includes
the application of its rules of private international
law. Such a mechanism is complex and may lead
to unpredictable results. Therefore, Guidline 30
excludes renvoi and provides that the application
of law designated by the Guidelines means the
application of the rules of law in force in that State
other than its rules of private international law.

Short comments
131 Guideline 31 addresses the issue of arbitrability of
intellectual property disputes, on which significant
differences exist between national legal systems,
such differences being a considerable source of
uncertainty in international trade. In this respect,
the Guideline seeks to provide direction to
adjudicators, while at the same time allowing them a
certain degree of flexibility. It also bears in mind the
need to ensure the enforceability of arbitral awards
rendered on matters of intellectual property.

Extended comments
Hypothetical
A work created by an artist from A and published
first in A is infringed in State B. Under Guideline
25, B’s law is applicable, protection being sought
in B. Nevertheless under B’s private international
law, “copyright in a published work shall be governed
by the legislation of the State in which the work is first
made lawfully accessible to the public”. If renvoi were
applicable, A’s law would have to be applied to that
issue. The exclusion of the renvoi excludes to apply
B’s choice of law rules, the application of B’s law
being limited to substantial B rules.

132 In view of this, the Guideline provides that judges
and arbitrators shall take into consideration the
provisions of the two laws that are more relevant
to govern the said issue. These laws are, on the one
hand, the lex arbitri, which in a large number of
legal systems is that of the State of the seat of the
arbitration, whose courts may set the award aside
for lack of arbitrability of the subject matter of the
dispute; and, on the other hand, the lex protectionis,
i.e., the law of the State for the territory of which
protection of the disputed right is sought, insofar
as compliance with the provisions of that law is
required in order to safeguard the enforceability of
the award in that State.

130 Guideline 30 and its exclusion of renvoi is in line
with most modern instruments in the field, such as
the Hague conventions on the law applicable to noncontractual obligations and the EU Rome Regulations
70
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Judgment of the CJEU, C-135/15, EU:C:2016:774 – Nikiforidis,
paragraph 51.
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Extended comments

Agreement on a Unified Patent Court entered into by
a number of Member States of the European Union
on 19 February 2013.72

Hypothetical 1

The different national approaches with respect to the
arbitrability of intellectual property disputes

A sues B for the alleged breach of a license concerning
the use of a patent registered in France before an
arbitral tribunal sitting in Belgium. B raises as a
defense the invalidity of that patent. Under both the
lex arbitri and the lex protectionis the arbitral tribunal
may decide on the validity of the patent, although
pursuant to the former of those laws such a decision
may only be rendered with inter partes effects. The
arbitral tribunal is free to rule on the defense, since
none of the laws involved rejects its arbitrability and
hence, from this point of view, the enforceability of
the award is ensured in both States.

135 Intellectual property rights are, to a large extent,
monopolies on the use of intangible goods, which
affect competition within the territory of the State
that grants them. For this reason, jurisdiction over
intellectual property disputes is often reserved to
the courts of the granting State. In those cases, no
arbitration of such disputes is allowed, at least in
what concerns registered rights. This is the case, e.g.,
of South Africa as regards patent matters.73
136 Other States allow arbitration of disputes concerning
such rights, but set substantial limitations thereto,
e.g., by not permitting arbitral tribunals to rule on
their validity, as happens in Germany, where the
jurisdiction of the Federal Patent Court is generally
held to be exclusive in what concerns validity
issues;74 or by empowering arbitral tribunals to do so
only with inter partes effects, as is the case of France,75
Portugal,76 and the United States77.

Hypothetical 2
A sues B for the alleged infringement of a trademark
registered in Germany before an arbitral tribunal
sitting in Switzerland. The issue of the validity of
the trademark is raised by the defendant in the
proceedings. Although Swiss law allows the arbitral
tribunal to rule on that issue, under German law
the matter is not arbitrable and, accordingly, the
enforcement of an arbitral award that ruled on that
issue could be refused in Germany on the basis of
Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention.71 Insofar
as the award is intended to be enforced in Germany,
the arbitral tribunal should take into consideration
German law when ruling on its own jurisdiction.

137 Full arbitrability of such disputes, including the
validity of industrial property titles, is nevertheless
allowed by a third group of States, which includes,
e.g., Belgium.78
138 Considerable differences also exist in what concerns
the arbitrability of claims concerning non-registered
rights: while some States, such as France, deem moral
rights as inalienable, and thus disputes concerning
such rights are in principle not arbitrable, other
States allow certain transactions regarding moral
rights, such as consent to the modification of a
literary or artistic work. Disputes arising from such
transactions are thus arbitrable in those States.79

The contemporary trend towards the liberalization of
intellectual property arbitration
133 Parties may choose arbitration as an alternative
to court litigation in intellectual property
disputes, inter alia, for the following reasons: the
concentration of proceedings in disputes arising
from the cross-border exploitation of intellectual
property rights; the avoidance of parallel litigation
before national courts and inconsistent decisions
ensuing therefrom; the confidentiality and greater
expediency of the proceedings; the neutrality and
expertise of adjudicators; and the extended crossborder enforceability of arbitral awards allowed by
the New York Convention.
134 A trend towards the liberalization of intellectual
property arbitration has thus emerged over the
past few decades. A recent expression of this was
the creation of a Mediation and Arbitration Center
seated in Lisbon and Ljubljana by Article 35 of the

71
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See New York Convention on the Enforcement and
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958).
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[2013] OJ C175/1.

73

See article 18(1) of the South African Patent Act.

74

See § 65 of the German Patent Act.

75

See the ruling of the French Supreme Court of 28 February
2008, Société Liv Hidravlika D.O.O v. S.A. Diebolt.

76

See Article 3(3) of Law no. 62/2011, of 12 December 2011, as
amended by Decree-Law no. 110/2018, of 10 December 2018.

77

See Section 294 of the Patent Act.
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See Article 51(1) of the Patent Law.

79

See, for instance, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette, 1 SCR 178 [2003].

2021

Marie-Elodie Ancel, Nicolas Binctin, Josef Drexl et al.
139 Claims concerning patrimonial rights are generally
regarded as arbitrable.80 However, since droit de
suite is a non-waivable patrimonial right, it is not
an arbitrable matter in legal systems, such as the
French one, in which only disputes concerning droits
disponibles are arbitrable.81

146 Guideline 31 is thus meant to serve both as
an orientation to adjudicators and as a rule of
restraint, in cases where the connection with the
abovementioned laws is scant, while simultaneously
giving courts and arbitrators sufficient discretion to
take into consideration the particular circumstances
of the case.

The need for uniform conflict rules

Dário Moura Vicente

140 The situation described above is a source of
uncertainty with respect to the enforceability of
arbitral awards on intellectual property disputes.
There is thus a clear need for uniform conflict of
laws rules on the issue of arbitrability of intellectual
property disputes, even if only soft law ones.
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141 Such is the purpose of the present Guideline. It is
addressed both to State courts and arbitral tribunals:
the former may have to determine the arbitrability
of a dispute on intellectual property rights either
in annulment or enforcement proceedings; the
latter may have to do so when assessing their own
jurisdiction under the Kompetenz-Kompetenz rule.
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The relevant laws
142 As mentioned above, two laws are most strongly
entitled to govern this issue: the lex arbitri (i.e., the
law governing the arbitration), the application of
which ensures the enforceability of the arbitral
award in the State of the seat of the tribunal; and
the lex protectionis (i.e., the law of the State for the
territory of which protection of the disputed rights
is sought), compliance with which may be necessary
in order to safeguard the enforceability of its award.
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143 The present Guideline recognizes the need to take
into consideration both laws when deciding issues
of arbitrability of intellectual property disputes,
although some restraint should be adopted in
respect of both of them.
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144 Regarding the lex arbitri, its competence to
govern the issue at stake may, in fact, be limited
if the intellectual property rights in issue have no
relationship with that law, e.g., because it is the law
of the arbitral seat and this has been chosen by the
parties merely because it provides a neutral forum
regarding the interests in dispute.
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145 The lex protectionis may also not be decisive with
respect to the issues at stake if, for example, the
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arbitral award is not intended for recognition in a
State where the disputed right is registered.
80

See, e.g., in France, Article L 331-1 of the French Code of
Intellectual Property.
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See Article 2059 of the French Civil Code.
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